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Foreword
The use of original case studies for teaching and learning has a long
history . Some institutions base a substantial part of their curricula on the
case method . In the social services too, case analysis has occupied a key
position in preparing practitioners to assume professional responsibilities
in social agencies . Paradoxically, the professional literature is largely
barren of useful cases. Student recording of organizational experiences,
on the other hand, is almost universally required .
In this volume, a serious and informed observer has undertaken the
task of preparing detailed and pointed but concise case studies . A sophisticated social scientist, he conducted a series of interviews and observations with leading management actors in a variety of human service organizations, and distilled the most relevant behaviors in order to cast light
on the inner workings of organizational leadership . Dr. Young has here
moved successfully between the shoals of too great brevity and too elaborate detail, with a view to making each case situation available for ready
discussion and analysis.
While stressing entrepreneurship, these studies deal with a variety of
aspects of organizational life and touch upon a number of social policy issues. They provide vivid material on innovation, change and organizational growth, detailing constraints and opportunities grasped by creative
and skilled executives . The settings of the studies differ in a number of
ways . Those who have an interest in understanding the problems of
serving children will find a rich lode of professional insight. Others will
recognize problems and dilemmas faced by their organizations . Students
will find rich material for reflection and study, for here are live, "real"
people, many known widely in the field .
The individual studies concentrate on a special aspect of executive
leadership- the entrepreneurial spirit, exploring and seizing opportunities for establishing and extending human services . In this sense they deal
with particular ways of engineering organizational change.
Teachers will welcome these recorded experiences for use in the human service classroom. Administrators will find an abundance of illustration of principles of management practice.
This volume is an important contribution to the social organizational
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literature. One hopes it will stimulate others to pursue the example here
provided.

Simon Slavin
Editor, Administration in Social Work
Professor of Social Administration
and Founding Dean Emeritus
Temple University

Preface

Case studies have long been a mainstay of education for management
of organizations in the commercial sector of the economy . Theory and
methods courses are essential too, but the idea behind case studies is that.
the overall complexity and richness of management problems and life in
organizations can best be appreciated and understood by experiencing
them - if not directly then at least through the eyes of others as related
through case material.
In the area of human services, case material has not, to this point in
time, been commonly available or commonly used . One reason for this is
that education for human services has put much less emphasis on management and administration than has education for business, or education for
government for that matter. The human services , largely concentrated in
the nonprofit sector of the economy, are administered by specialized professionals, highly trained in the treatment or technical methodologies of
their disciplines - social work, health care, education, the arts - with
normally just a smattering of management training added in.
This is changing . Human service organizations ·in the current economy
of scarce resources and efficiency-minded funding sources have come to
realize the importance of good management. And education programs for
the human services are beginning to put greater emphasis on rigorous
managerial training. Indeed, health administration, arts administration,
and other areas of human services administration have begun to develop
into important and self-contained specialties in their own right.
Which brings us back .to case studies . Those who are now being educated for administration in the human services require case materials
drawn from these service areas, as existing materials from the business or
government sectors can be stretched only so far in order to portray the
kinds of experiences human services administrators will face . The collection of cases presented in this volume is intended to address the present
lacuna.
These cases are addressed to particular aspects of human services management- the processes of new program development and the management of organizational change. There is particular emphasis here on entrepreneurial activity, that is, enterprising behavior by administrators and
other leaders of human service organizations . Thus, just as in the commercial sector, entrepreneurs or enterprising individuals are seen as linchpins or catalytic agents that help set important organizational changes and
xi
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program developments in motion, and are largely responsible for their
successful implementation. This too, is a view that has been neglected in
the education of human service administrators, heretofore, and which
needs to become a part of such curricula in the future .
The cases here are not widely spread over all areas of human services.
Indeed they are concentrated largely on developments in child welfare ,
though this is broadly construed to encompass not only foster care but
also management information systems, mental health care, education,
preventive and community-based services, management consulting , diagnostic service programs, programs for runaway youth, and general youth
programming. Generically, however, the cases deal with a wide array of
types of organizational change, ranging from development of new programs to the birth of new organizations , the merger of organizations, and
the expansion and diversification of the service offerings of various agencies. Moreover, the cases touch on many other intrinsic aspects of organizational administration including management of professionals and other
staff, working with trustees, financing of programs through government
and private sources, coping with governmental regulatory processes, and
managing relationships with organizational clients and constituent
groups. The cases also cut across sector lines; while most of the cases are
based in the nonprofit sector, three .cases are drawn from the governmental sector, as well. Thus, the cases are believed to have a very wide band
of application for human service administrators not only in social services, but in other professional services areas as well .
The cases were originally developed as part of a research project on
entrepreneurship in nonprofit organizations, under sponsorship of the
Program on Non-Profit Organizations in the Institution for Social and
Policy Studies of Yale University . The cases contributed to a theory of
nonprofit organizational behavior' and have since been refined as teaching material, successfully tested in courses in nonprofit organizational
management at the State University of New York at Stony Brook and at
Yale University . As they are written in nontechnical, easy-to-read language, students enjoy them and digest them quickly. They seem to be
most effectively used as the basis of open seminar-style discussions of
particular issues or lessons the instructor may wish to draw from a given
case. As the introductory chapter indicates. the possible choices for such
topics are manifold, and thus the cases quite flexibly inserted into the
menus of management courses in a variety of ways. However, there is
also great value in allowing the cases to speak for themselves . Having
read the cases, students often come up with their own interpretations and
ideas on what might have happened or what should have been done in the
'Young, D. R. ( 1983) If not for profit, for what? Lcxinglon, MA : Lcxinglon Dooks.

Preface

xiii

circumstances described. As a teacher, I have often found that the most
interesting way to use the cases is to keep my own preconceived notions
in check, and to allow the interchange among intelligent graduate students to take its own course .
Dennis R . Young
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Introduction

Since 'tis Nature's law to change,
Constancy alone is strange

-John Wilmot , Earl of Rochester (17th Century)
An important strand of the theory and literature on organizations and
bureaucracy centers on the notion that formal organizations permit society to carry out its ongoing functions more efficiently by structuring work
into programmed tasks and sequences. By extension, the management of
such organizations can be viewed as a routine control and support function -- pushing the right buttons, making the right corrections, providing
regular supervision and administrative services, and so on , so that organizations continue to operate smoothly and reliably in a steady state. No
doubt, mastery of the routine aspects of administration arc essential to
successful organizational management. But routine administration is by
no means the most interesting nor even the most important part of effective organizational management, in the human services or elsewhere in
the economy .
It is perhaps trite to indicate that human service agencies, like organizations in other industries , are dynamic entities. They must adapt to
changes in their social and economic environments and they must respond to the advance of professional knowledge and scientific technology . To stand still in a changing world is to invite organizational disaster.
Thus a key to successful management, especially in the long run, is the
understanding of how and why organizations undertake change and how
changes in programs and organizational structure can be effectively developed and administered . Indeed, the appropriate image of a successful
manager may be less that of controller and facilitator of routine services ,
than that of leader and entrepreneur- a person who can chart a clear and
confidence-inspiring course for his organization and pull together the various elements needed to implement such plans successfully . In the human
services particularly , the entrepreneurial role has not been well understood . Narrowly interpreted, the term "entrepreneur" conjures up images
of profit making and wheeling and dealing for purposes of self-interest.
But as the cases in this volume graphically illustrate, there is much more
to it than this. Entrepreneuring in the human services involves a wide variety of motivations - selfish and unselfish - and it is a functjon that is
essential to the ability of human service organizations to carry out their
acknowledged, legitimate societal missions .
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It is worth a note of clarification to mention that while entrepreneurship is central to managing an organization's successful adaptation to
change, entrepreneurship is not precisely congruent with the responsibilities of executive leadership. Entrepreneurship entails identifying a new
concept or idea, e.g., a new service to be offered or a new way of providing an existing service, garnering resources and support, planning and
advocating, and overseeing implementation of a venture-in short, doing
whatever is necessary to move a project from concept to reality. Executive leadership, in contrast, entails a much more general set of responsibilities, for organizational change, as well as for organizational maintenance and stability.
To expand on this point, various routine or day-to-day aspects of organizational life must be tended to by executives-much of this routine
activity legitimately characterized as leadership . For instance, a top executive must serve as a good role model for his subordinates, personifying
enthusiasm, proper work habits, and style so as to maintain employees'
morale through exhortation and example, and to convey the organization's values and ideology (what recent writers on corporate management
have called superordinate goals).
To the contrary, entrepreneurship, a nonroutine function, while it
clearly involves leadership behavior, can to an extent be delegated by executives to other staff members by granting them sufficient autonomy and
resources . Board members or trustees may also involve themselves in enterprising activity on behalf of the organization. Some staff may even
specialize in entrepreneurial projects rather than routine administrative responsibilities, just as some executives may farm out as much routine administration as possible so as to concentrate on enterprising . (See the
GLIE and Sanctuary cases for contrasting examples.)
In short, entrepreneurship and executive leadership are not full coincident: Entrepreneurs in an organization may not be executives, though
they are leaders in a general sense, and executives may not be entrepreneurs. However, as an empirical matter, the correlation between the two
roles is strong . And one thing seems certain-successful executive management of human service organizations in a dynamic world requires that
the entrepreneurial function be adt:quately provided for, one way or another. Such provision may entail direct and intensive executive involvement in enterprising activity, as in the cases of Greer and GLIE presented
here, or it may involve, as in the Huntington Sanctuary case, establishing
an effective organizational regime within which the executive can encourage, nurture, control, and otherwise facilitate new ventures undertaken
by staff.
How then can the management of entrepreneurship and organizational
change be learned? Probably not very well through textbooks or even case
studies. Experience is always the best teacher. However, as an initial exposure, case studies do have the distinct advantage of relating the actual
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experiences of real administrators and managers and other leaders who
have been responsible for carrying out important projects that have altered the faces of organizations, brought new organizations into existence, and have had significant effects and implications for the industries
in which they have taken place. Learning the lessons embedded in these
cases should help aspiring managers and even those with some managerial experience to embark on their own ventures with some confidence
and awareness of the principles they should apply, the factors they should
be aware of, and the pitfalls and opportunities that may lie ahead. Perhaps
such study will reduce some of the "trial" in the unavoidably trial-anderror process of mastering this subject, and will help to minimize the
prospects of failure, either failure by commission of strategic errors, or
failure to recognize or exploit circumstances where enterprising activity
is appropriate or opportune.
Before fleshing out some of the perspectives and management lessons
on which instructors may wish to have their students focus their attentions and discussions, a few words on the selection and structure of the
cases themselves is in order. Since the human services are delivered primarily through public and private nonprofit organizations, and because
the objective of this volume is to provide educational material illuminating the management of change in primarily professional rather than commercial contexts, the cases here are confined to public and nonprofit
enterprise. Moreover, the balance of cases take place in the private, nonprofit sector where the dearth of managerial case studies has been particularly acute. It should be noted, however, that all but one of the private,
nonprofit cases involve considerable interaction with government, and
that virtually all of the cases reflect the importance of the governmentvoluntary sector relationships that pervade delivery of human services in
the U.S .-relationships that human service managers must deal with, no
matter what the sector to which their organizations formally belong .
The cases are grouped into four categories and subcategories according
to the type of venture, and· the particular sector of the economy within
which a case takes place . Most of the cases (11 in all) take place in the
private, nonprofit sector and within this collection cases involve three different types of activity: the founding of new organizations from scratch;
the founding of new organizations under the wing of existing or parent
agencies; and the development of major new programs or expansion of
activities by existing organizations .
Three cases of human service ventures in the government sector are
also presented . These provide some perspective on differences in incentives, constraints, motivations, problems, and opportunities, between
government and the private, nonprofit sector. One of the public sector
cases concerns the establishment of a new organization (youth bureau);
the other two focus on the development of new programs within the context of existing organizations. As indicated in the Preface, all the cases
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cluster in the general field of child welfare but range very widely in terms
of particular services and programs within this field. Moreover, as elaborated below, the cases concentrate on generic management problems and
aspects of organizational change that appl.y to a very wide spectrum of organizations dealing with professional or human services.
A comment on the methodology of construction of the cases is in order
at this point. As noted in the Preface, the cases originally contributed to a
theoretical study of behavior of nonprofit organizations. 1 In that context,
a variety of different types of ventures, along the lines noted above, were
sought. Through various types of (formal and informal) inquiry, organizations which had exhibited each variety of venture (establishing a new
organization, developing a new program, etc .) within recent memory
were identified . The rationale was that cases that had transpired recently
would offer better access to the principal actors involved, greater accuracy of memory of these actors, and greater availability of written documentation.
Ultimately twenty-one cases were identified in organizations whose
decision-makers agreed to cooperate. (All of these cases were written up.
Three took place in the proprietary sector. Fourteen of the remaining
eighteen cases were selected for this volume.) In each case, as many of
the principal actors as possible were interviewed extensively by the author. Interviews were tape-recorded and later transcribed . Available written materials such as annual reports, minutes, proposals and other documents were studied as well, and, where possible, outside observers were
also consulted . The cases were each written up in draft form and circulated to those interviewed to check accuracy. and subsequently revised
and edited . As presented here, the cases provide the available facts, the
views of the principal actors, and the author's suggested interpretation
and explanation of events.
In order to facilitate comparative discussion and analysis of the cases,
they are all structured into a uniform format. Each case is divided into
nine sections, each of which describes a particular dimension to the case,
as follows:
Precis. This is a short overview summarizing what the venture is,
when and where it took place, and a brief glimpse of its character.
The Entrepreneur( s). This section brietly introduces the key participants and indicates some of the history, skills, philosophy, and motivations of these individuals.
The Organization(s). Here an overview is given of the organi7.ational
context in which the venture takes place . This includes characterization of
the parent organization(s)~if the venture is a new internal program,
'Young, D. R. (1983) If not for profit, for what? Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
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spin-off, or a merger- and if applicable, a description of the new organization .
Chronology of Events. This is simply a list in chronological order of
the key events leading to and culminating in the implementation of the
venture at issue. This section is intended to serve as a convenient reference for the reader, to guide him in tracking the sequence of events.
Context . This section discusses the social context in which the venture
takes place . This includes demographic, economic, and social trends, as
well as developments in the professional disciplines that served as stimulative and long-run determining factors influencing the case.
Choices . This section describes the strategic choices facing the managers and entrepreneurs in the case, the alternatives they considered, and
the reasons they selected particular courses of act,ion .
Risks and Constraints. Here the professional, personal, organizational,
and financial risks facing decision-makers are described and assessed,
and the financial, regulatory, bureaucratic, political, and other constraining factors that inhibited the venture's implementation or affected its
form, are identified and discussed .
Outcomes. This section tells what ultimately came of the venture, as of
a given cutoff date (approximately mid- 1979) when documentation was
completed. Some sense of the ultimate success or failure of the venture
can be gleaned from this presentation .
Analysis. This is a brief discussion that brings together various aspects
of the case and suggests a way to crystallize and summarize why the venture took place in its particular form and circumstances. A sense of the
overall "chemistry" required to carry off the venture is indicated here.
LESSONS AND PERSPECTIVES

What is the student of management and administration in the human
services to learn from these cases? To answer this question, let us begin
with the premise previously stated that successfully managing a human
service organization requires the ability to guide and inspire programmatic and organizational change, not only the ability to ride out stonns
and trends in the organizational environment but perhaps more importantly
to anticipate requirements for change and to lead an organization through
constructive adaptations in advance of debilitating crises. This ability in
tum requires that the manager have: ( 1) a good understanding of how and
why major changes in organizations take place and what factors shape
the outcomes of efforts to change, and (2) a mastery of strategies and
techniques and a knowledge of the prerequisites for successfully implementing and managing change. In the following few pages, an overview
of the perspectives and lessons that can be drawn from the cases will be
presented . The intent here is to identify some of the important points
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instructors may wish to emphasize and have discussed by their students .
There is no claim of comprehensiveness here, however. Each case is sufficiently rich in detail that instructors or students are likely to draw many
other perspectives, interpretations , and management lessons of general
value on the subject of change or on other managerial questions such as
management styles, organizational relationships, and so on. Indeed this
flexibility represents much of the educational value of case studies per se.
The cases are meant to be provocative and to challenge the reader, but
neither the following discussion nor even the analyses presented in each
of the cases constitute the last word. Rather, this material is meant to be
suggestive, and perhaps a good jumping off point from which further
discussion can take place .

General Perspectives on How and Why Change Takes Place
At least four different lessons may be drawn from the cases here on the
subject of why and when major changes take place in human service organizations . These lessons repeat themselves throughout the cases, but
here we shall highlight only a few important instances .
The first important perspective is that changes often occlir as part of a
process of solving an important internal organizational problem . The second perspective is that changes are driven by entrepreneurs who are in the
right place at the right time and devote great amounts of energy to the
project, for a variety of strong personal motives . The third perspective is
that changes at the organization level usually reflect trends and long-term
developments in the social, economic, and technological environment of
the organization . Fourth, change often reflects the crystallization of some
important, new idea.

Problem Solving
A pessimist could survey the cases in this book and observe that organizational crises are the seedbed of change and that unfortunately organizational managers and trustees tend not to see far enough ahead to head off
such crises with reforms earlier on . An optimist on the other hand, would
note that severe crises often allow organizations to change in ways that
make them much stronger and healthier in the end . Both perspectives
seem to have strong elements of truth . Financial crises and related difficulties with the quality and workload of organizational services are prominent among the cases and seem often to be at the root of impending
change. For example, Seabury Bam , a residential program for runaway
youth sponsored by the Smith Haven Ministries (SHM), was a compromise component of a package proposal to a state funding agency designed
to shore up the Ministries financial condition and allow it to honor its serious debt obligations.
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Sometimes financial problems are tied closely to workload problems.
Characteristic of many charitable organizations, Smith Haven Ministries
and the Group Child Care Consultant Services {GCCCS) were overextended in terms of the services they wanted to provide their needy clientele, compared to the resources that were available to provide these services. A new program and a reorganization followed from these
circumstances, respectively. The Harlem-Dowling program sponsored by
the Spence-Chapin organization was also inspired in part by an economic
overburden the agency faced with its foster care program, and a desire to
avoid having its foster care program overwhelm the main agenda of adoption and research and demonstration programs that Spence-Chapin con sidered its principal mission.
Quality problems sometimes couple with financial difficulties to inspire change. The two spectacular examples of the Florida Sheriffs Youth
Fund and Greer-Woodycrest Children's Services illustrate how the greatest successes in organizational growth, development, modernization, and
efficiency, can follow from the depths of physical plant and service deterioration and management stagnation . Greer and Florida Sheriffs are classic "turnaround" situations.
Finally, serious "image" problems tha.t impair and threaten an organization's relationships with its supporters and constituents may be seen to
inspire change. In the case of Greer, the perception of low quality by state
regulators was a serious blow and impetus to reform. In the case of Florida Sheriffs, it was the poor public image of the sheriffs as law-enforcement officials that prompted their organization to get into the business of
helping troubled youth. And in the case of the Pleasantville Diagnostic
Center of the Jewish Child Care Association {JCCA), the perceptions of
New York City officials and others in the child care community, that
JCCA, especially its Pleasantville campus, was an institution only for
well-behaved, white Jewish children, stung at a time when the social priorities required service to troubled minority children. In all these instances, the image problem contributed to an impetus to do something to
reverse those outside perceptions, perceptions which represented a serious long run threat to the viability of the organizations involved.

Entrepreneurs
It is impossible to read the cases here without realizing that the energies, drives, and skills of entrepreneuring managers or other leaders are
crucial to the formulation, launching, implementation, and nurturing of
new programs and organizations. It is clear in many of the cases that the
particular organizational changes might never have occurred without the
right entrepreneurial characters in place at the particular time. For example, the Group Live-In Experience (GLIE) in the South Bronx, the Sagamore outpatient program, and the Melville House on Long Island, are
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special and unusual programs that are uniquely associated with particular
social entrepreneurs and seem unlikely to have come into existence without them. There seems to be no inevitability surrounding such innovations, and without their entrepreneurial roots there seems to be no reason
to believe that something like them would have sprung up in a proximate
time and place .
In other cases, where alternate ventures might have filled in the vacant
market niches, the entrepreneurs clearly put their individual stamps on
the character of the programs they inspired, and at the least could be credited with ventures their organizations would not otherwise have undertaken or succeeded in. Greer, for example, or Florida Sheriffs Youth
Fund, might not have survived at all, much less develop into the organizational pathbreakers they eventually became, were it not for the fortuitous employment of Harry Weaver and Ian Morrison, respectively, at
crucial times in the histories of these organizations . While in cases such
as the Child Welfare Information Service, the Sanctuary Program of the
Huntington Youth Bureau, and the Brookhaven Youth Bureau, it seems
clear that some programs like these would eventually have come along
(with other leaders at the helm), the expediency with which they did develop, and the particular form they took, derived much of their substance
from the ideas and energies of the entrepreneurial characters, Joe Gavrin,
Andy Casazza, and Tom Williams, respectively.
Finally, it is of interest to note that the opportunity to make money or
to gain other material rewards is not necessarily the essential or even most
common motivation underlying enterprising behavior in the human services. Contrary to the stereotypical concept of the entrepreneur, financial
return is not the sole engine of venture even in the profit-making sector,
and certainly not in the not-for-profit parts of the economy. A perusal of
the cases here reveals that motivations vary widely. They include: artistic-like urges to build and create; the seeking of status or inner satisfaction from professional achievement and accomplishment; a psychological
need to test oneself and prove that one is capable of carrying off a major
project or program; pursuit of innate desires to help, teach, or serve the
less fortunate members of society; intellectual satisfaction from shaping
and implementing new ideas; the achievement of personal recognition,
power, and social status; the urge to control people and events; the fulfillment of strong social or religious beliefs or causes; a desire for autonomy
and independence (to be one's own boss); maternal-like satisfactions of
parenting an enterprise and seeing it grow; and material security and gain .
Thus the entrepreneurs encountered in the cases here are quite a diverse
group, ranging from the grandiose builders like Bert Beck, Jay Goldsmith, and Ian Morrison to the outspoken and unencumbered firebrand
Lorraine Reilly, to the soft-spoken, behind-the-scenes facilitators like Joe
Gavrin and Peter Ryan, to the persistent idealists like Tom Williams and
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Ken Goldman, to the highly professional achievers Jane Edwards, Andy
Casazza, and Mary Hagamen, to the very businesslike Harry Weaver, to
the almost reluctant enterpriser and devoted educator in the person of
Alan Keith-Lucas . But this diversity of motives and styles belies certain
strong common traits that bind these entrepreneurial characters together- the intense energies and commitments they have exhibited in
pursuing their objectives in clear, single-minded, and opportune fashion.

1'he Environment
While each venture is impressive and somewhat unique in its own
right, each case may also been seen as a current or eddy in a stream of
social, economic, and technological change. No organization changes in
a vacuum, and most organizational changes signal larger changes taking
place in the environment. Thus, while individual ventures and program
developments may not be inevitable manifestations of environmental
trends, at the very least these ventures tend to blossom when developments in that environment signal that "their time has come."
Technological change, for example, is reflected in the case of the
Child Welfare Information Service (CWIS) where the advent of the computer makes inevitable improved information processing for management
of child care agencies in the New York City system, and prompts the
agencies to take initiative in this direction . Or, in the case of the Sagamore Outpatient Clinic, new professional knowledge of mental retardation and autism in children influenced the development of new, noninstitutional services .
Changes in the economic environment also have a strong influence in
prompting enterprising behavior. In the instance of Harlem-Dowling, for
example, the New York City fiscal crisis severely depressed the per diem
rates which the City could pay for child care, at first delaying the possibil ity of launching this new agency, but eventually creating such strains on
the parent agency (Spence-Chapin) that cutting the new agency loose became imperative.
Demographic trends may be seen to underlie much of the economic
pressure that influences the development of new ventures in the human
services . In the case of the Jewish Board of Family and Children's Services (JBFCS), a merger of two Jewish agencies in New York City reflected the need for services consolidation in a region where the Jewish
population was declining. By contrast, the case of Florida Sheriffs Youth
Fund illustrates how a venture can ride a demographic trend to prosperity,
in this instance, the growing elderly population in Florida which generated a strong element of voluntary contributions through estate planning.
Demographic change may be observed to have a much more pervasive
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influence on enterprise in human services than just what is felt through direct economic effects . The increase in the youth population in Brookhaven Town, for example, was a major justification for the establishment
of the Youth Bureau in that location while that same trend in nearby
Huntington Town and surrounding Suffolk County underlay the developments of the Sanctuary program in Huntington and Smith Haven Ministries' Seabury Barn, respectively. Similarly the turnover of youth and
family populations in New York City, featuring a large influx of racial
minorities, played a large part in stimulating the program developments
of Greer-Woodycrcst Children's Services, Pleasantville Diagnostic Center, Harlem-Dowling, and other cases in this volume .
Other kinds of social changes also influence organizational enterprise
in important ways . The growing phenomenon of runaway youth in the
1960s and 1970s, for example, was a direct antecedent of the programs
presented in the GLIE, Sanctuary, and Seabury Barn case studies . And
the deterioration of urban centers such as the South Bronx or the Lower
East Side of New York helped inspire the GLIE and Lower East Side
Family Union (LESFU) projects. Finally, important shifts in the role and
character of government social services policies overtime underlie a number of the changes described in the case studies. Demands for greater accountability in the public sector, for example, directly influenced the development of projects like CWIS which would provide better information
to monitor child care agencies under contract to government, while the
deinstitutionalization movements in mental health and retardation, social
services, and criminal justice, which deemphasized residential care in favor of services delivered in the community, underwrote elements of the
GLIE, Sagamore, and LESFU cases.
In short, it is almost always necessary to ask where an individual venture fits into the "big picture" of social, economic, and technical change,
in order to obtain a comprehens've understanding of why a given enterprise developed in the particular time, place, and form that it did . Even
where particular ventures seem to buck the trends, such as the Florida
Sheriffs Youth Fund case, which grew solely on private, philanthropic
funding ai a time when dependence of social service agencies on government funds was generally dramatically increasing, they can be understood by studying the local context, in this case, the growing elderly
population and the political conservatism of Florida.

Ideas
It is striking how often the strength of simple but profound new ideas
or concepts serve to inspire and crystallize program developments. Such
ideas may capture the essential purpose or character of ventures, hence
their articulation gives the participating parties the vision they need to
push the enterprise forward and rally its supporters. A few examples will
suffice to illustrate this phenomenon . In the Child Welfare Information
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Service case, the idea that "information is power" played an important
motivating role, and the desire for shared control over such infonnation
underlay much of the energy for the child care agencies to develop a management information system of their own before the government developed one in which they would have little part. In the Huntington Sanctuary, Brookhaven Youth Bureau, LESFU, and JBFCS cases, the "model"
of a comprehensive mental health or social service delivery system that
coordinates various kinds of services from different sources or divisions
provided the essential design principle by which these enterprises were
developed. In the case of LESFU and Harlem-Dowling, the concept of
social service agencies having to be firmly rooted into the local communitics and populations they service also played a central inspirational role.
Professional concepts, reflecting current disciplinary thinking in social
work, mental health, and related fields provide the intellectual cores
around which various other programmatic developments grow. For example, the idea of comprehensive problem diagnosis prior to foster care
placement formed the conceptual foundation for the Pleasantville venture, while the concepts of deinstitutionalization and preventive services
clearly influenced the Sagamore and LESFU developments.
Reform strategies also may constitute the central idea. In the case of
Sagamore Children's Center, Mary Hagamen devised the "inside/out" notion to convert the center from inpatient to outpatient emphasis over time,
while in the Pleasantville case, Jake Trobe saw the diagnostic center as a
"foot in the door" that would eventually turn the program emphasis of the
whole agency around. In both these cases, the entrepreneurs worked with
an explicit concept of incremental or evolutionary reform, envisioning
how their initial projects would set in motion a long-term sequence of
constructive change.
In short, the context of organizational problems, the presence of entrepreneurial energies, skills, and motivation; trends in the social, economic, and technological environment; and the conception and articulation of key ideas seem to constitute much of the basic chemistry leading
to important organizational changes and program developments . For the
human services manager it is well to be able to recognize these circumstances and prerequisites if one is to be capable of fostering change by
planting the seeds of reform into fertile soil. But what of the nurturing of
these seeds and resultant seedlings? What lessons can we draw from the
cases, for the successful management of change? We turn to this question
next .

Principles of Managing Change
There are of course no cookbook solutions to successfully carrying off
the development of a major programmatic or organizational enterprise.
Every venture is different and of necessity a large degree of adaptation
and "learning while doing" must take place, even for seasoned managers
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and leaders in longstanding organizations. But a perusal of the cases here
reveals a surprising number of common principles and lessons that seem
to underlie success, and these seem worth fleshing out for consideration:

( 1) Styles of administration must be adapted to fit the circumstances.

Most managers and leaders have their own personal styles of administration. Some prefer tight centralized control and others put more emphasis
on delegation of responsibilities and decentralized control. Some prefer
expansion and development of large organizations , and others lean to
spinning off new programs as autonomous units, and so on . Similarly,
organizations develop their own cultures, policies, and styles of administration over time, which may reflect their size, diversity, age, sources of
support, and programmatic objectives . Certainly a wide variety of organizational structures and administrative styles is reflected in the fourteen
cases presented here.
It is interesting, however, that the form in which new program developments are administered is not always consistent either with the intrinsic
preferences of the guiding entrepreneur nor with the historical style of the
organization in which the developments take place. Rather, the styles and
strategies for new developments often seem to follow an internal logic
dictated by the intrinsic concepts and environmental circumstances in
which they are built.
There are several noteworthy examples of this in the cases here. Harlem-Dowling was an embryonic program in the Spence-Chapin agency
whose executive style was tight central control. Yet the logic of the program, its ability to function as an indigenous agency to the Harlem community, required a loosening of such control and eventually a letting go
entirely . It took discipline on the part of the guiding executive, Jane
Edwards, to allow this to happen. A similar case in point is LESFU, a
program also built on the concept of indigenous local operation and on
the principle of coordinating packages of social services from a number
of different local social service organizations . Yet LESFU started out as a
program within the Henry Street Settlement under direction of Bert Beck
whose intrinsic preferences were to maintain and expand the repertoire of
programs under his direct jurisdiction. However, the logic of the program
and the cooperation of other local agencies dictated otherwise. Again,
Beck had the insight and discipline to let go .
In various other cases, there is more harmony between the logic andrequirements of the fledgling program and the intrinsic preferences of the
entrepreneur or the style of the parent agency . Joe Gavrin, for example,
was perfectly happy to move the CWIS program outside of his Council on
Voluntary Child Care Agencies (COVCCA) both as a logical step in its
development and as a way of keeping COVCCA in the small and informal style he preferred . And Jay Goldsmith was content, even enthusiastic,
to decentralize the JBFCS in order to make management of this very large
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new agency more viable. So too, the expansiv'e style of Ian Morrison fit
the strategy of expansion through merger on which his agency was embarked . In still other cases, however, the reluctance of the entrepreneur to
adapt his or her management style to what the program change appeared
to require seemed to cause problems. Alan Keith-Lucas's reluctance to
get too heavily involved in administration may have held back the needed
formalization of GCCCS, for example, when that agency was growing
quickly and running into substantial financial and other management difficulties. And, while the fierce, antibureaucratic rebellious style of Mary
Hagamen served her well when her program was in vogue and outside
funding was available, it may have come back to haunt her when the circumstances changed and the bureaucrats were back in the driver's seat.
A relevant aside here is that the complex and multifaceted requirements for management and entrepreneurial leadership may sometimes be
divided into subspecialities, allowing the skills and styles of alternative
officers to better match the requirements of the job to be done. In several
cases here, this takes the form of having a "Mr. Outside" and a " Mr. Inside." For example, in the Pleasantville case, Jake Trobe is the dominant
figure in dealing with the outside world and with his agency 's overall
governance and administration, but Paul Steinfeld is given the responsibility for implementing the project itself and running it on a day-to-day
basis. Similarly, in the Harlem-Dowling case, Jane Edwards is the head
honcho but Joe Smith is given responsibility for laying the groundwork in
the Harlem community, and initially implementing and running the program . In these cases and others, the chief executives were able to organize themselves in a manner which met the projects' requirements without cramping their personal administrative styles. In the case of LESFU,
on the other hand, finding an adequate Mr. Inside proved to be a problem .
In short, entrepreneurs may be able to pick and choose their ventures,
and organize their agencies, in a manner consistent with their administrative and leadership styles, but sometimes the intrinsic concepts behind the
innovation being implemented, or particular stages in the development of
those projects, require adaptation and rethinking of administrative strategies to ensure continued success.
(2) Managing change requires sensitivity to staff, trustees, and consti-

tuents.

Change is not made without inconvenience, even from worse to
better.

- Richard Hooker, in the "English Dictionary"

(16th Century)

Change is, by definition, disruptive. In human service organizations it
affects the welfare of a number of important groups ·of participants-
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staff, trustees, clients, and the like. Given that successful implementation
of change usually requires (at least the passive) cooperation of these participants, an important tenet in the management of change is to deal sensitively with them-bringing them along in partnership, or at least making
them aware of why certain painful adjustments or compromises need to
be made; giving credit for their support and sacrifice; distributing benefits
and costs in a manner that is perceived as fair and reasonable; and respecting existing loyalties, sentimentalities, and personal principles
where possible.
Certain of the cases present examples of such sensitive behavior in
clear terms. The JBFCS case involved the merger of two agencies with
long traditions, loyal staff and boards members, and ties to their client
communities. Most of the energy in carrying out the merger was spent on
working out arrrangcments that would minimize the dislocations and relieve the anxieties of those involved, while still accomplishing the consolidation objectives. Meetings, discussions, training sessions, protocols for
allocating positions on the board and staff, "massaging personalities,"
and paying meticulous attention to the language employed to describe
what was being done - for example emphasizing the concept of a "marriage of equals"- dominated the proceedings . Even so, the proposed
merger almost failed because of sensitive feelings on both sides of the
aisle.
The case of the Brookhaven Youth Bureau provides another good example of sensitive management. Here, because the program was to be implemented in the local public sector, the entrepreneur Tom Williams was
meticulous in his efforts to build bipartisan support in order to minimize
the risks facing the council members he had gotten behind the effort. He
was careful to give credit for the successes, however, and to propose service patterns that benefitted alternative local jurisdictions in a balanced
way. The Pleasantville case provides another such example, where an explicit incremental change strategy was adopted in part to bring anxious
staff members along slowly, rather than to try to impose a sudden radical
shift in clientele upon them .
The Harlem-Dowling case is even more intriguing in this respect. Anxieties of staff members understandably nervous about breaking away
from the parent agency were here balanced against the growing impatience of would-be board members of the new agency whose autonomy
had been delayed . Here management had to stroke two different groups
whose interests were at odds with one another.
In other cases, an inadequate degree of sensitivity may have accounted
for problems in implementing or maintaining the venture at issue . In the
LESFU case, tensions between research- and demonstration-oriented
management and service-oriented staff members were not very well ameliorated. And in the Sagamore case, inattention to the sagging morale of
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the staff of the contracting inpatient department may have contributed to
conditions that eventually became unstable .
Clearly, sensitivity to affected groups cannot dominate the scenarios of
change, else too often nothing would be done . Too many have vested interests in the status quo . Hard decisions need to be made, such as in the
Greer case where longstanding staff members had to be let go. But therealization that changes will be painful and that successful change can depend on ameliorating that discomfort seems to be a key element in the
successful management of major change.
(3) Being creative. Just as problem solving often forms the basis of enterprising behavior, creative solutions to problems frequently seem to
spell the difference between the successful implementation of a venture
and its stagnation or failure . In a number of the cases, stubborn operational difficulties threatened the viability of whole initiatives and efforts
to develop and implement new programs. At the same time , creative
thinking-- formulating new alternatives or new ways of approaching the
problem - saved the day . These creative solutions, though modest in
concept, had the common characteristic of being out of the ordinary,
demonstrating the need for enterprisers to avoid the mental rut of always
going by the book, but rather thinking things out afresh when conventional ways of doing things do not work.
A few examples from the cases will suffice to illustrate the point. In
the instance of GLIE, the ordinary procedures for certifying the new
agency had led to stalemate. Someone (Barbara Blum of the State Board
of Social Welfare) came up with the bright idea of putting the new program under the wing of an existing agency. The solution was obvious, but
only in retrospect. Similarly, in the Florida Sheriffs experience, a restrictive trust stood in the way of plans to diversify and expand beyond programs for boys . Harry Weaver conceived the bright idea of setting up
multiple corporations at least as a way of circumventing the restrictions in
the short run, and as a way of demonstrating to the courts later on that the
restrictions had to be lifted. It was not a conventional solution, but it
worked. In the Jewish Board of Family and Children's Services case,
there was a problem of who would become the board president of the
newly merged agency. A Solomon-like arrangement was developed
whereby the board presidency would go to the current board president of
one of the merging agencies, but then shift to his counterpart in the other
agency for a longer term after a given period of time. Unusual, but it was
accepted .
The managerial lesson in all of this is straightforward enough, if not so
easy to carry out in practice: explore all the angles and don't be confined
by the conventional ways of doing things . A simple solution to a knotty
operational problem may mean the difference between success and failure.
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(4) Enterprise requires risk-taking . Classically, commercial entrepreneurship is commonly associated with risk-taking of a financial nature . There is some of this kind of risk-taking in the public and nonprofit
human services as well. In cases such as Melville House or the Brookhaven Youth Bureau, the entrepreneurs faced personal financial sacrifice,
at least in the short run, and put their future incomes at risk .
Still, if the cases here are at all typical, financial risk-taking does not
seem to be the primary gamble for those who guide new ventures and undertake major programmatic change in the human services . Rather such
individuals appear to go out on a limb in other ways, perhaps more courageous ways than simply financial peril . Specifically, these leaders often
put their professional and managerial reputations on the line, and risk the
security of their jobs, by undertaking bold initiatives whose consequences
cannot be fully anticipated . Moreover, the process of organizational
change and the ·success of major new ventures seems to depend importantly on the willingness of entrepreneurs to assume such risks .
In several of the cases, the ventures involved controversial new programs, which if they failed would invite the disdain of professional peers.
In the Harlem-Dowling case, for example, there were more than enough
naysayers who thought it was foolish to try to establish a new human services agency in the rocky social soil of Harlem . As a fledgling executive
director, Mrs . Edwards faced potential ridicule from fellow social workers and loss of effectiveness as an administrator if the venture had backfired . Similarly, Jake Trobe and Paul Steinfeld perceived themselves as
playing with fire in their effort to establish a diagnostic center for potentially violent and disruptive children on their campus at Pleasantville.
One serious incident might have jeopardized the project and the longterm reform strategy it spearheaded, and would have put the future personal effectiveness of these administrators in doubt as well. The case of
the Huntington Sanctuary program is similar. One serious incident associated with the overnight placement of a runaway youth might have undermined the program and had serious implications for the youth bureau
itself.
In other cases, the new ventures threatened to mar the reputations and
effectiveness of the organizations and increase the managerial burdens of
executives, because they introduced complexity into existing administration arrangements . In the case of Seabury Bam, an additional program in
an area where the organization had no experience (residential care) was
being grafted onto an organi7.ation (SHM) which already was straining to
hold itself together. Yet this new program promised financial salvation
and necessitated the risk. In the Florida Sheriffs case, Harry Weaver set
up multiple corporations for his different campus programs, gambling
that the courts would strike down the restrictive trust on his Boys Ranch
and allow him ultimately to consolidate the organization's operations into
a manageable administrative structure. Had he lost this gamble, he would
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have been saddled with a highly cumbersome and unwieldy managerial
arrangement. But had he not tried, he would have been unable to undertake the subsequent expansion and growth of the Youth Fund enterprise .
Finally, in the case of the Jewish Board of Family and Children's Services, two agencies of manageable size and individually respected reputa:.
lions were merged into a new, very large agency whose future shape and
prospects were theorized but largely unknown. Moreover, these agencies
were coaxed along into consolidation by the executive directors of each,
one of whom, Jay Goldsmith, would have to administer the new arrangement. Not only could Goldsmith be blamed for whatever failure or loss of
reputation the new agency might incur, but he faced a potentially overwhelming managerial burden had he not been able to reorganize in a manner that would ease the responsibilities of the top man .
Finally, entrepreneurs in these human services case studies sometimes
exhibited an explicit willingness to stick their necks out by taking actions
that were unauthorized but which seemed necessary to keep their ventures
on track. Most often this brand of risk-taking involved refusal to wait for
official government approvals prior to opening new facilities for business. In the cases of GLIE and Seabury Barn such actions were taken
both for economic reasons and to prod the bureaucracy into faster action,
but they were gambles nonetheless.
Any consideration of risk-taking must of course take into account both
sides of the coin-i.e., what were the risks of doing something versus
not doing it. In several cases, especially those where the venture represented a solution to an important and pressing organizational problem,
the risks of not undertaking the proposed project or program were clearly
high as well. This applies, for example, to the Seabury Bam case and the
early stages of the Greer and Florida Sheriffs experiences, where not undertaking the initiatives might have meant the financial failures of the
agencies involved. In other instances, however, the dangers of inaction
were not necessarily imminent and the risks were taken by those who
could foresee potential long-term benefits from their short term gambles
and sacrifices.
(5) Successful enterprise requires persistence. While the entrepreneurial characters encountered in the cases here are a very dynamic and
sometimes fervent, hot-blooded group of personalities, they all exhibit
unusual degrees of patience and what is called in the slang "stick-to-itiveness ." Constraints and complications pepper these cases as they would
all significant ventures involving major change, yet the entrepreneurs refused to be defeated by these roadblocks and indeed took them on as personal challenges. This behavior comes out most clearly where these
enterprising individuals had to deal with government to obtain certifications, approvals or funding, and where they had to overcome skepticism, political reservations, and bureaucratic inertia and inconsistency.
This is nowhere better illustrated than in the case of Melville House,
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where obtaining certification from the state bureaucracy to open the facility dragged on interminably and threatened to sink the venture at various
points, but where the resolve of the entrepreneurs eventually won out.
Similarly, in the GLIE case a charter for the new agency had to be fought
for, and interim governance arrangements accepted, before the city's regulatory machinery allowed the program to officially open. And in the
case of Sagamore Children's Center, the persistence of the entrepreneur
is illustrated by her incredible energy and effort in coping with the state
civil service system in order to hire suitable staff for her outpatient program.
Persistence and patience is required not only with the bureaucracy but
with the overriding political system as well . Thus, in the Seabury Barn
case, Peter Ryan spent endless hours in negotiation with county legislators as well as state officials over funding and governance arrangements
acceptable to these interests. Andy Casazza and his staff repeatedly resubmitted their grant proposals for Sanctuary until it was funded. And
Tom Williams waited patiently through changes in the town's administration until a receptive town supervisor and councilmen were in place ; then
he persisted in his efforts to document needs, garner support , and ultimately gain appointment as the Brookhaven Youth Bureau director.
Of course many other facets of enterprise require similar persistence,
including pursuit of internal agency matters. Thus, Jane Edwards had to
keep up the pressure over a long period of time in order to avoid any tendency of staff members comfortable with present arrangements to slow
the emancipation of the Harlem-Dowling project. And Jay Goldsmith had
to anticipate months of meetings and negotiations not only to prepare personnel for the JBFCS consolidation, but to deal with setbacks, and to ease
the implementation and smooth the transition once the merger had offi cially taken place.
Overall, the lesson seems to be that the guiding entrepreneurs and
managers must be clear-minded about what is to be accoinplished, but.
must also expect that accomplishment to take a long time and to encounter many problems along the way . Ventures can thus fail either because
the leaders can lose their senses of direction in the midst of the numerous
barriers to implementation, or because they may lack the fortitude to keep
plugging in the face of resistance , distraction, and delay .
(6) Beware the dilemmas offunding. One of the trickiest problems the
entrepreneurs in these cases seem to encounter is balancing the programmatic and organizational implications of accepting various sources of
funds against the benefits of that support. Often , the implications arc subtle and even deceiving . In other instances, the implications are fully understood and anticipated, and either fund s arc rejected or accepted with
awareness of the consequences .
In various cases , concessions are made as a necessity of essential fund -

Introduction

19

ing . In the GLIE case, an onerous oversight arrangement is accepted as a
way of qualifying for foster case funding . Even more dramatically, GLIE
is forced to separate from its advocacy activities as a condition of funding
for its services. The Seabury Bam case also exhibits an example where
undesired oversight arrangements are accepted in exchange for funding
eligibility. For GCCCS, concessions in autonomy were also the price extracted for overhead support from the university in which the organization
is housed.
Alternatively, agencies are sometimes forced to make service program
concessions in exchange for funding . Thus, Seabury Bam was itself a
project taken on by the Smith Haven Ministries in exchange for funding
support of SHM's other programs . And in the LESFU case, spinning-off
the project from the Henry Street Settlement was a partial consequence of
securing a grant from the state.
In other instances, funding sources were specifically rejected because
of the programmatic implications they contained. Thus GLIE rejected
various juvenile justice and drug program monies in order to avoid the
labelling of its clients that this would entail. And more spectacularly, the
Florida Sheriffs organization scrupulously avoided government money of
any sort in order to preserve its autonomy and avoid any entanglements
that might interfere with its program objectives .
In various cases, the leaders and managers devised strategies to free
themselves somewhat from the oppressive consequences of receiving
funds from particular sources. Diversification is one strategy, employed
by GLIE for example in its later stages of<levelopment, and sought by the
designers of the JBFCS merger that combined agencies with primary dependence on different public and private funding sources. The federal
grant for the Sagamore outpatient project was another instance where diversification permitted escaping the requirements of the state's regular
(inpatient-oriented) funding system.
Another strategy is deliberate ambiguity in proposal writing for grant
funds . This was an idea used in the LESFU case as a way of maximizing
the chances of funding from different sources as well as allowing nexibility in implementation. A third strategy, for the private agencies at least,
was to build up endowment or reserve funds that could ultimately generate income in the form of returns on investment, free of external conditions and restraints . This was the objective of Harry Weaver in the Florida Sheriffs case.
But these strategies, even if they worked, were not without problems
and unanticipated consequences. For LESFU, ambiguity in the proposal
stage translated into uncertainties and tensions when it came to detailed
program design and implementation. And in the case of Florida Sheriffs,
the strategy of building up reserves meant putting great emphasis on
fund-raising activity and particularly the solicitation of donations from
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conservative elderly contributors, which in tum seemed to dull the aggressiveness and shunt the planning for the agency's primary objective-services to predelinquent youth.
Other dilemmas are also raised by decisions on funding. What was to
be the future of the outpatient program at Sagamore when the special
grant ran out, given that the state's regular funding programs were designed for inpatient care? Was permanence ever possible in this regime?
And what about the dangers of false secur.ity once comfortable endowment funds are put into place, as they were in the instance of the Greer
agency prior to its deterioration? No easy answers appear to exist. The
lesson for management then is to be aware enough to look gift horses in
the mouth and to anticipate and be prepared for it when they buck .

The Chemistry of Success
A final perspective that seems worth imparting to the student of management in the human services is that purposeful organizational and program change cannot be taken for granted. Rather it requires explicit management attention, adherence to sttategies and principles of the kind
indicated in the previous section, and an appreciation of the conditions
conducive to change and the elements prerequisite to it. More than this, it
is useful to recognize that change is fragile and that successful change requires that unstable elements be brought together at the same time and
place in order for the necessary interactions to take place, i.e., the chemistry of change to be effected. The case studies are, by and large, studies
of ventures that were successful, at least for a period of time. Instances
where ventures were nipped in the bud, or were foregone for lack of the
proper combination of factors, would of course be much harder to find
and to document. But the number of these would no doubt overwhelm the
number of successes that can be identified.
Even the case studies of success, however, contain with them substantial evidence of how fragile, even serendipitous, successful implementation of change can be. Case after case belies the unique combinations of
factors, or the critical timing, or the fortuitous catalytic element responsible for action and progress where there might have been none . For example, it is hard to imagine development of the GLIE program without the
unique personality of Lorraine Reilly . Indeed , in many cases, GLIE,
LESFU and GCCCS among them, leadership was a critical commodity,
and where it floundered, so did the enterprise. The GLIE experience also
illustrates how a fortuitous suggestion that a parent agency be found to
overcome the barriers to having GLIE enter the child care system can
make the difference between action and stagnation . The Pleasantville
case too demonstrates the role of fortuitous circumstances - the fact that
a building fund drive just happened to be going on that could supply reno-
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vat ion funds for a new program facility, and the unanticipated bright idea
that Medicaid rates could be adjusted to cover the operating costs. These
elements allowed the project to ignite and takeoff when it might otherwise have gone by the boards. Well-timed, sometimes unexpected grant
opportunities, such as those that arose in the cases of Sagamore, Sanctuary, and Seabury Barn, also attest to the fortunate confluence of events
that often seems to underlie the successful launching of important ventures. And usually the window of opportunity is quite narrow once the
necessary elements appear to be in place. The JBFCS merger, for example, had to exploit the retirement of Shep Sherman and be effected before
his agency would begin to look for a replacement for him. Moreover, the
timing between the agreement to merge and effecting of the agreement itself seemed quite critical. A long enough period was needed to explore
the implications, but too long a time period would allow people to have
second thoughts and opponents to gather strength . Similarly in the case of
Harlem-Dowling, the timing of emancipation of the program from the
parent agency Spence-Chapin was critical- too early and the new
agency would fall on its face, too late and internal resistance would grow
and the motivations to effect the separation would be diffused . And in the
instance of Melville House, much further delays in certification by the
state would surely have led to an aborted enterprise .
All this is not to suggest that a programmatic organizational change is
simply a happenstance affair. A good bit of luck does seem to be involved . But the real managerial lesson here is that circumstances favorable to the successful launching and growth of an enterprising activity do
not last forever, and must be recognized and exploited when they do occur. The successful manager of change in the human services field is not
unlike a tightrope walker, who needs to master the skills, assess the climactic conditions, map a strategy, make the necessary adjustments in his
machinery, resolve to carry on and to assume the risks, understand the
potential consequences, and finally when conditions are favorable, make
the narrow passage over dangerous territory to hopefully stable ground on
the other side .

Group Live-In Experience, Inc. (GLIE)
PRECIS
GLIE is a child care agency for older children, established in the South
Bronx in 1972. It grew out of the Claremont League for Urban Betterment (CLUB), an advocacy group developed under auspices of Our Lady
of Victory Roman Catholic Church on behalf of distressed families in the
Webster Butler housing projects. Under the dynamic leadership of Sister
Lorraine Reilly, GLIE developed three group homes for adolescents,
an emergency placement unit for runaway youth, an innovative long-term
apartment-living program for older adolescents, and special residential
programs for multiply handicapped and autistic youth.

THE ENTREPRENEUR
Several individuals· contributed substantially to the successful establishment and growth of GLIE. The early protagonists such as Gary
Waldron, Carmen Goytia, Ellen Garcia, Father Joseph Fitzpatrick, and
Father Tim Collins were all active in the South Bronx community,
mostly through Our Lady of Victory Roman Catholic Church and the associated Claremont League for Urban Betterment. But the central character was Sister Lorraine Reilly, a teacher in the Lady of Victory Parish and
an active participant and organizer in the Claremont League at the time
GLIE began to emerge. Sister Lorraine is a native and lifelong resident of
the South Bronx , a fact which has shaped her single-minded dedication to
the renewal of this area .
Sister Lorraine's dynamic personality and humanistic orientation combine themselves into an unusual managerial style . She is feisty and independent, and not afraid to call the shots as she sees them. She can also be
very demanding of staff, if she sees a discrepancy between their interests
and that of the kids. But, as tough as she can be, Lorraine Reilly is not
comfortable as an administrator and in fact she disdains this role and sees
herself as a creator, catalyst, and enterpriser. For example, she is quick to
turn over program responsibilities to people under her and to delegate
authority.
Moreover, Sister Lorraine expresses a basic preference for keeping
GLIE small, and spinning-off new programs. This orientation is based
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partly on Sister Reilly 's distrust of large bureaucratic organizations and
her belief that a service organization should be close to the community it
serves. But it is also a matter of her personal style and motives . She is "a
fast mover" and lack of encumbrance and freedom of action are essential
to her way of doing things .
Gary Waldron calls Sister Lorraine a" 'charismatic advocate. ' People
tend to want to follow her as a leader . .. . I think she is an advocate of the
first order. She believes that the only way the system will change ... is to
make a lot of noise . . . . That is what she does."
A strong motivating factor in Sister Lorraine's calculus is indeed community involvement and social activism. She sees herself primarily as a
social work organizer, with the South Bronx as her universe. Her career
exhibits a consistent activist orientation . The Claremont League, and the
beginnings of GLIE, are examples .
Caring about people, especially kids, and about the neighborhoods she
grew up in, and being talented and able to do something to organize and
help them - especially in view of the dramatic deterioration of the
Bronx - is a great energizer for Lorraine Reilly. She says she plans to
continue to devote her efforts to this particular comer of the world, and
she means it .

THE ORGANIZATIONS
GLIE was born out of the Claremont League for Urban Betterment
(CLUB), grew under the wing of St. Dominic's child care agency in its
first three years, and has since evolved as an independent, but still changing, child care agency in its own right.
The relationship of GLIE to St. Dominic's Children's Home from
1972- 1975 was a short-Jived convenience that enabled GLIE to begin
operations before it could secure official status as an independent child
care agency . Essentially, St . Dominic's, a chartered foster care institution
affiliated with the Catholic Church and the Dominican Order of Sisters to
which Sister Reilly belongs, acted as the fiscal agent through which GLIE
could be reimbursed for services by the New York City Department of
Social Services. Aside from administrative hassles, however, there was
little substantive interaction of St. Dominic's with GLIE. (See Choices
below .)
If St. Dominic's was a temporary foster parent to GLIE, the Claremont
League for Urban Betterment was GLIE' s true lineage . CLUB developed
as a community action of Our Lady of Victory Church and Parish in the
Crotona Park area of the South Bronx . According to Sister Lorraine:" ...
It really starts in '65 (when we didn't [even) have a name) within Our
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Lady of Victory Parish ... working with gangs and being with kids [from
the! city [housing projects] .. .. In 1967, through Catholic Charities, we
got a grant of $5,000 to develop an advocacy [program) to work with
families having difficulty .. . . We incorporated as CLUB [in 1968] and
[began) doing tenant organizing . By '68 [with support of Catholic Charities and foundations - including United Fund) we had two storefronts .
One was totally for adolescents-an after school tutorial program, an
evening rap session program [with] gang members, teenagers ... whatever. And the other one was an advocacy storefront. . .. From '68 to '72
we worked so much with gangs ... setting them up in abandoned buildings [etc . ) that we got into the whole syndrome and we decided to try to
apply . . . rfor child care agency status]."
The founders of CLUB were people active in the Church parish. The
parish priest was a key figure, along with Gary Waldron, an IBM manager who grew up in the South Bronx and was active in youth recreation
programs, parishioners Carmen Goytia, Ellen Garcia, Sister Joan, and
Sister Lorraine . It was both a service organization and advocacy group,
which according to Gary Waldron:" . . . Attempted to service community
people, youth, people with welfare problems, outreach services, and all
that." It was basically an informal, volunteer operation, with only three
paid staff.
As an informal organization, with no steady means of support and no
hard-and-fast mandate, CLUB depended on the commitment of a few
people. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Claremont League dissolved shortly after the GLIE program began in 1972. Sister Reilly's energies were devoted to GLIE, and, according to Waldron, "When she
spun off from CLUB, several things happened .... The local pastor left
the priesthood and [CLUB) began to become less and less effective because there was no driving force behind it. There wasn't anybody available every day. There were some people working, but they weren't doing
very much, and if l were to look back, I think that GLIE was the thing
that was beginning to grow on its own, and Lorraine was really off doing
her own thing . . . quite apart from anything Claremont had offered at that
point."
Indeed, in a very real sense, GLIE is simply the part of CLUB that survived, albeit altered in form and purpose. Many of the CLUB founders
became active in GLIE . And, GLIE continues in the same tradition as
CLUB-with its roots in the church and dedication to the community of
the South Bronx. As Sister Lorraine explains: "We really are [confined to
the Bronx Community] . . . . We might help another group get started,
you know. But I don't think the Board would go along. . . . Anything
within the community .. . fine, but outside the community ... no."
Since its founding in 1972, GLIE has expanded its board membership
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considerably beyond the core group [e.g., Waldron, Goytia] from CLUB.
Membership now includes the chairperson of the local community planning board, a nurse and active member of the Baptist Church, a probation
officer, a university professor, a bank employee . . . all people with an
active involvement in the local community and/or professional interest in
youth problems.
However, the selection of board members became considerably more
"worldly" as Sister Lorraine describes: "The Volunteer Urban Consulting
Group . . . had a book called Candidates for Directors . . . published
yearly ... of graduates of Harvard who are interested in becoming members of boards of directors. So we went through that book and picked
[three men] . .. called them up and out of that three, two were interested
. .. [eventually one] came on board."
Until 1979, the board of directors had not been particularly influential
in setting policy for GLIE compared to the single-minded style of Lorraine Reilly's leadership. But Gary Waldron saw this changing:" . .. We
have gone through some redefinitions of board roles and board memberships and needs of the board. We are getting a lot closer to goals and measurement than we ever were before. We have gathered some very, very
interested members to the board. I think these two things alone are going
to help to make the board more effective. This is one half. The other half
is that as that board becomes more effective, it is going to contend with
her [Sister Lorraine] more ... . There is going to be more contention . ..
and she is . . . just not going to be allowed to do some things that
she would do in her own pioneering way. Probably it will create some
boxes [constraints], some parameters of her actions . . . . It may make her
uncomfortable because of the style that she had enjoyed for a long
time . ... "
Fund-raising is one illustrative area, whe e Sister Lorraine has essentially been a one-woman show . Waldron continues:" ... She has done it
in the past. You know, she would get wind of a proposal and she would
go out there and .. . get our proposal approved .. .. She did virtually all
of that. I got some IBM funds, and a lady from Morgan Guarantee [got] a
few thousand dollars, but the big funding sources were primarily driven
by Lorraine .... She is kind of a magic lady . .. . She would come in and
be able to sell them stuff. And they would agree with it, and would fund it
for her."
General organization and management have also revolved around the
personality of Sister Lorraine. As noted above, GLIE is decentralized to
suit her own "fast-moving" style and disdain for administration . And
GLIE's decentralized style of administration extends into its philosophy
of growth, where Waldron notes:" .. . She believes that there ought to be
a series of . . . small programs that grow on their own, eventually spin-off
and become independent things."
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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
1965-The Claremont League begins informally (without a name)
as a community project by Our Lady of Victory Church and Parish .
CLUB begins to work with gang youth in the Webster-Butler housing
projects.
1967-CLUB receives a $5,000 grant for an advocacy program on behalf of families in difficulty from Catholic Charities.
1968 - CLUB is incorporated. By this time it has two storefront operations. One provides tutoring and job counseling services for youth. The
other provides day care and recreation programs, and general advocacy
activity.
1968-1972-CLUB does considerable work with youth and gangs,
including provision of shelter in the abandoned buildings over the storefronts. Funds are received from Greater New York Fund as well as Catholic Charities over this period .
1972 - CLUB applies to the city and state to develop a group home for
adolescent youth, but the state refuses to grant CLUB status as a child
caring agency . The city's Director of Special Services for Children, Barbara Blum, suggests that the proposed program affiliate with an existing
child care agency . As a Dominican Sister, Lorraine Reilly approaches St.
Dominic's Children's Home (in Blauvelt, New York) for the purpose of
obtaining sponsorship.
GLIE opens as a single group home for girls , separate from CLUB, under auspices of St. Dominic's, which operates as receiver and administrator of funds . The arrangement calls for GLIE to work towards autonomy
within three years.
1973-CLUB dissolves . .
1972 - 1975 - GLIE develops two additional group homes for adolescents, making a total of three short-term (90 day) residences - one for
boys and two for girls.
July, 1975- GLIE incorporates as an independent, nonprofit child
care agency, and formally separates from St. Dominic's.
July, 1976-GLIE is one of three New York City programs to receive
federal funds under the Runaway Youth Act (Juvenile Justice Act of
1974). It establishes a 24-hour emergency placement unit (8-bed crash
pad) intended for lengths of stay up to two weeks.
December, 1976- GLIE contracts with the New York State Department of Mental Hygiene to provide urban group home care for twelve
multiply handicapped and retarded youth from the Willowbrook State
Hospital (or similar institutions). Such children were being moved from
Willowbrook under state decree . Implementation of that decree was administered by Barbara Blum, appointed as Assistant Commissioner of
Mental Hygiene for that purpose .
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January, 1977- An innovative long-range program of independent,
apartment living is developed for older (16 - 17 year old) adolescents.
1977 - GLIE receives a grant from the Greater New York Fund toestablish the groundwork for a program for autistic children . The agency
also requests permission of the New York City Board of Education to develop an alternative high school for truant youth.
CONTEXT

GLIE has grown up at the intersection of several social crosscurrents.
Its roots in the Claremont League recall the poverty program era of the
mid-sixties, when community organizing and advocacy on behalf of deprived minorities in the cities were in full bloom across the nation. So,
too, CLUB was a manifestation of a new activism of the clergy in bringing about desired social change at home and abroad (e .g., Vietnam) . Certainly CLUB was a response to the deterioration of the city, especially the
social pathofogy associated with the large, impersonal, low income housing projects that were built in the fifties and sixties to house the inflow of
blacks and Hispanics and to replace older deteriorated housing.
In the world of urban decay, the South Bronx had become the symbol.
National recognition was underlined in 1977 when President Carter personally visited the area and promised a program to rebuild from the devastation. But the deterioration had become obvious and widespread long
before that - as early as the late fifties. By the mid-sixties the South
Bronx was already in terrible shape, with rapid abandonment of buildings
by landlords, soaring rates of crime, frequent fires, and so on . The education system was another victim, and the impacts of deterioration were felt
particularly hard by youth .
Some of these youth became "urban nomads," a particular variety of
"runaway" who remained in his community but spent little time with
whatever family he might have . Rather, he or she hung out with others in
a gang and sought whatever shelter was available. This is the type of
youth 1hat was attracted to CLUB, and was ultimately served by GLIE.
Thus, another social crosscurrent surrounding GLIE was the phenomenon
of runaway youth.
In a photo essay for U.S. Catholic magazine in 1977, Sister Lorraine
implies that youthful runaways are akin to discoverers and explorers, and
are part of a long-standing history of transients in Western civilization .
Be that as it may, it is clear that the runaway phenomenon came to national prominence in the late 1960s with the flower children of Haight·
Ashbury in San Francisco.
in the early seventies the flow of young runaways into the sex industry,
particularly on the "Minnesota strip" in the Times Square area of New
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York City, came to light. Through organization and lobbying by people
like Rev . Bruce Ritter and Lorraine Reilly, the federal Runaway Youth
Act was enacted in 1974, providing funds for information exchange and
program development. In New York State, runaway legislation was
passed in 1978 to fund sanctuary and other types of programs for runaway
youth . From its beginning GLIE has serviced the runaway youth of the
South Bronx, especially those that improvised shelter in the burnt-out and
abandoned buildings . In 1976 it received one of the earliest allocations of
federal runaway funds to establish its emergency shelter "crash pad," the
only existing 24-hour emergency service in the Bronx .
Finally, GLIE has been entwined in the changes taking place in the
governmental social services systems at large. For example, GLIE joined
the child care system at a time when it was becoming clear that the population of children requiring foster care was changing radically in age composition from younger to older children, and from relatively "normal" to
behaviorally difficult youngsters. GLIE proposed to serve this new breed
of foster child . Indeed, GLIE' s emergence coincides fairly closely with
the establishment of a separate reimbursement rate for group homes by
New York City 's Office of Special Services for Children. Despite thereluctance of the State Board of Social Welfare to authorize GLIE as an independent agency in 1972 (see Choices, Constraints below), it was undoubtedly these social imperatives that brought forth support and
encouragement for GLIE by the City, especially by Barbara Blum, then
Assistant Commissioner in charge of Special Services for Children.
Another crosscurrent, later in GLIE's history, was the deinstitutionalization movement as it applied to mental hospitals in New York State . Of
particular interest, a court decree in 1976 ordered the State to dismantle its
Willowbrook institution for the retarded and multiply handicapped, and
to place its residents into community-based programs . The job of implementing this decree was given to Barbara Blum, and it was GLIE that responded within its own mandate, with a program to service (largely
Bronx-originated) Willowbrook children , in a group home setting .
Sister Lorraine is quick to contend that if those involved in GLIE had
not responded to the various social needs emerging in the South Bronx
others would have. This hypothesis may be questionable, but the social
context ce11ainly inspired and strongly shaped the founding and development of GLIE .
CHOICES
The founding of GLIE involved several stages of decision-making.
The first stage was based on the realization that current CLUB activities
on behalf of local youth were not adequate or sustainable indefinitely, and
that more substantial services and support were necessary . Sister Lorraine
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explains the need to undertake residential services: "We tried [counseling
and referral to other agencies] .. . but [in] the end ... we found ourselves putting [up] more and more .. . kids [in the abandoned buildings] .
. . . Their [problems were1family dysfunction and their needs [were1to
get out. ... [Often it was the] healthiest kid [in a family] who wanted
out, even if it was for only a short period of time .. .. Sometimes [when)
you really did intensive therapy, it was better to separate the youngster
from the problem, so he could look back and see the problem . .. then he
could go back in, and do very well . But when we found ourselves setting
up so many kids a month in an old abandoned building . . . it seemed
ridiculous."
One obvious alternative was referral to existing agencies and institutions, all of which were some distance from the South Bronx - usually in
upstate New York. But this proved not to be viable: "Kids whom you finally convinced to go . . . [wouldn't stay there). You'd take them up
there and tell them; 'Look at the beautiful trees . Ah, it's great! ' [But) by
the time you'd get back to New York, they were sitting here on the steps.
They hitch-hiked back. They couldn't deal with it."
In any case, referral to other agencies did not, for the most part, represent a viable solution: "We thought of ... not developing [our own program and] sending the kids into the other recognized child care agencies.
But these were . .. older adolescents. The child care agencies didn't want
anybody over 14 in 1976. Now they'll take them up to 16, but then they
didn't want to hear about them . So we ... had no place to go with our
kids . .. ."
The first inclination of Sister Lorraine, and others involved in GLIE,
was to seek private funding, which would preserve flexibility : "Originally
. .. in '70, we put in a proposal to the National Campaign of Bishops .
. . . They were going to fund us .. . becauseit was a good idea. This was
minority kids, gang kids, the whole list. Then they sent it back to the
Archdiocese of New York and said, you fund half of it and we'll fund the
other half. [But] it was the Archbishop (of New York] . .. who said, 'No,
we are not going to fund that program because there's a (government]
system in child welfare that they can get into .... '" The lack of church
support was certainly a factor in turning to government sources, especially in 1972 when church resources for the Claremont League itself
were precarious.
Having resolved to seek governmental support, there was another basic
choice for GLIE promoters to make . The issues of stigma and labeling of
children were of paramount importance: "We didn't want to go into juvenile justice money . Kids have to have a name on them . . . . They would
be branded .. .. We didn 't want to go after drug money because a lot of
the kids had brothers who were already into drug rehab programs and it
also meant that they had a stigma attached to them .... So, we felt that
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the city, whose foster care system . .. should have been providing some
kind of prevention programming for kids living in the ghetto . .. [was the
appropriate choice] ."
The intent to seek support through the public foster care system
strongly influenced a number of subsequent organizational choices. For
one thing the effort would have to be organized on a nonprofit basis. This
was no problem since CLUB was already an incorporated nonprofit organization. However, passing thought was given to the possibility of direct
public provision through city government. Sister Lorraine recalls, " ...
The City has a program for hard-to-place youngsters ... [but] ... it's
been closed since. It was known to be a horrendous place ... all kinds of
atrocities were going on there . They had two settings, one for boys and
one for girls .. .. Two short-term facilities ... and they were really in
bad shape . . . . There was no reason to think that the City was going to
put on a better show . . . . [But] I don ' t know that that might not be a
[good] thing. You see, one of the underlying goals of GLIE is to employ
community people and to make sure that that is stable employment.
That's very important to us . So I'm not so sure that would have been a
bad idea , if the city government was a little more avant garde and progressive . It could really pull off an awful lot of good programs ."
The fact that CLUB was nonprofit was not qualification enough for
status as a child care organization eligible to receive public (per diem)
funding for residential child care services . The founders would be forced
to choose between CLUB and the GLIE program, and between an independent GLIE and one affiliated with an existing authorized agency .
The initial application did envision CLUB as the organizational auspices, but the broad mandate and informality of CLUB became an issue:
" . . . As a child care agency we couldn't do the kinds of advocacy work
[that CLUB did] ... and we [couldn't] set up an umbrella agency in that
way . . .. " Indeed, CLUB would have had to be radically changed
in terms of mission and structure to conform with Board of Social Welfare licensing requirements. Even with the willingness of CLUB to
do so, however: "The State of New York would not recognize us as
the Claremont League for Urban Betterment and refused to amend the
charter .. .. "
According to Sister Lorraine, the basic problem was the South Bronx
itself: "At the time, there were ... no group homes in the South Bronx,
not one . . . because the City and State officials felt that this was a deteriorating neighborhood . Nothing could be done here . . .. Listen , let me tell
you we had one commissioner who wouldn't even walk down the street.
"We were talking about . .. opening up in a very deteriorated community ... for that community 's stability. We were trying to tell them that
you would stabilize the South Bronx [this way, butl ... they could not
see . . . . "
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Gary Waldron sees the issues in a somewhat different perspective: "As
a separate group home, it was indeed an experiment .... There were two
issues as I understand it: [First] the credibility of community agencies in
general. . . . There was a Jot of scandal and a whole lot of reverends and
the like ripping off monies . . . . Secondly, the novelty of the program.
There was not universal agreement that that type of a program [urban
group homes] would be acceptable .. . . Most of the eggs were stored in
the other basket . .. kids went somewhere else in an institution setting
outside of New York City."
Fortunately, the founders of GLIE had a receptive ear in the City's Director of Special Services for Children, Barbara Blum . Mrs . Blum
wanted to see GLIE get off the ground, and suggested another alternative
to Sister Lorraine- affiliation, at least temporarily, with an established
agency. With that suggestion things began to fall into place in 1972. Sister Lorraine says she really had not previously seriously entertained the
notion of using the services of another agency, must less formal affiliation. But, given the idea, Sister Lorraine pursued it effectively. As Waldron described it, " . . . Only because she was a Dominican nun dealing
with a Dominican home, was [she] able to convince them to take a shot at
trying it this way .. . a different approach than used in the past. . . . It
was indeed an experiment. . .. St. Dominic's was an established agency .
If it would support the experiment, then the City would fund [us] through
St. Dominic's .. .. "
Sister Lorraine elaborates on the arrangements," ... If we could display to the City and the State what we were talking about ... then we
could get our own charter . .. . We would have three years to do it. . .. If
within three years we did not [secure] our own charter, St. Dominic's
would claim any group homes that we had opened . . . . "
Affiliation with St. Dominic's was not the preferred arrangement for
the founders of GLIE. Indeed, if Sister Lorraine had it to do again, she
says, " . . . We definitely would not have gone to St. Dominic's. We
would have fought for our charter . ... That was a mistake." Nonetheless, the arrangement did allow the GLIE program to get started. Gary
Waldron questions whether it would have been possible otherwise. But
Sister Lorraine is proud to point out that independence was achieved
within two and a half years.
The arrangement with St. Dominic's was, from the start, intended as
temporary. And the operation of this arrangement strongly reaffirmed this
initial preference. Sister Lorraine bristled under the wing of St. Dominic's, and the feelings of officials of the parent agency were probably mutual. A large part of the problem was money since St. Dominic's claimed
a good fraction of GLIE's reimbursement for overhead expenses. In addition, St. Dominic's tended to impose its policies on staffing and other
program parameters .
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On the other side of the argument, an official of the State Board of Social Welfare indicated that St. Dominic's might actually have been losing
money, because of loose bookkeeping and reporting by GLIE, i.e., that
reimbursement was not being made for all children actually in care . Gary
Waldron, who was GLIE's Treasurer at the time, gives a more balanced
appraisal. " . . . The [problem was] over an allocation [of funds] which
was very fair in St. Dominic's eyes . . .. It turned out to be 50 percent of
her [Sister Lorraine's] reimbursement that St. Dominic's was keeping, in
effect. ... [Sister Lorraine] was fair in believing that she was not getting
the right end of that deal. However, on the other side of the coin . . .
[they] were providing some accounting services and support services . It
was an accounting and billing process. They were going through the direct billing from the City . . . . I'm sure they were sharing a part of the
cost of their whole office staff." In any case, ultimate separation from St.
Dominic's was never in question, as far as the two principals were concerned .
In terms of programmatic content, GLIE's apartment-like group homes
were pretty much an outgrowth of the impromptu activity begun under
CLUB . But design parameters were influenced by child care regulations .
According to Sister Lorraine," ... We were ... obliged to listen to what
the bureaucrats wanted .... For instance, for us to open a group home,
we never thought of boys separate from girls, or six year olds not in the
same apartments as their mothers ... or single parents and a boyfriend
not living in the same apartment. .. . Whereas immediately all those host
of rules came in, so all the types of apartment development we had gotten
(into) with young people in abandoned buildings ... was now thrown
out. ... "
.
Later programmatic decisions of GLIE were shaped by a combination
of unanticipated opportunities and an underlying desire to escape the narrowness of the conventional child welfare system . The program of group
care for the multiply handicapped was a response to solicitation under the
Willowbrook decree. A new program for autistic children follows a simiJar scenario: "The Bronx Chapter for the Autistic came to our open house
[for) the two units for handicapped kids .... We hadn't thought of ...
ever doing anything like [a program for the autistic] but we said we would
help ... . The board said, 'Look into it, Lorraine. Do a little research ...
and tell us what you think ... . ' My research {showed that] a large number of autistic children in the Bronx were out of state. Wasn't that ·a good
enough reason to develop a program, if their families were asking that
they be close [by)? ... [So we went to] look for a grant. . . ."
Another example is the runaway program . "Once we got the temporary
houses [group homes] going, we realized we could only take in those
children that the Bureau of Child Welfare decided we could take in,
which still left out a lot of gang members . . . a lot of really nomadic,
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homeless youth ... which were words the City didn't even know . So we
went after [funds under] the National Runaway Youth Act .. . in '74
when it first came out. We did it again in '75 and we got the grant in '76,
[and] . . . opened the Crash Pad ... . [Now we could say], 'City, we
don't need your bread . No, we'll show you, who you should be caring
for .' ... We'd take in a kid and we'd call up and say, 'Listen, this kid
has bruises all over him; it's an abuse case, and you have to accept the
case .' ... We had the federal grant to help us . .. ."
In sum, the choices made in establishing GLIE and developing its program have been pragmatically designed to ensure success. A preference
for autonomy was temporarily subdued to achieve operational status.
Constraints were accepted to secure resources, but additional resources
were sought to loosen the constraints. In no case were the restrictions
crippling, and/or indeed permanently oppressive . And while the choices
have produced a variety of programs, there is an underlying consistency
in terms of semi-autonomous organizational units each servicing a real
need for youth in the South Bronx .

RISKS AND CONSTRAINTS
Sister Lorraine's basic style of enterprising is bold and tilted toward
risk . It is an orientation that was apparent from the beginnings of her
GLIE-related activity: "My own religious community thought that it was
crazy , and I knew I was at risk .... Becoming politically involved for me
was very risky. I really didn 't know anything about politics . .. Ialthough] I think I've enjoyed ... becoming involved politically and feeling that's really where the change has to happen .. .. If you don't get to
that, than whatever you're stirring up will definitely die ."
The risk-taking behavior of Sister Lorraine has been precipitated
largely on her perception that that is how you get things done in a world
of pernicious bureaucratic constraints and subterfuge. With respect to the
establishment of GLIE, the conservatism of government officials was
manifested in skepticism about the viability of any enterprise in the South
Bronx . Another barrier that Sister Lorraine cites is the existence of some
eighty other child care agencies in the City, and hence the official reluctance to approve "yet another one." But at the core of Sister Lorraine's
perception, and the barriers she and the others who founded GLIE faced,
is the system of Cateh-22 regulations in which the developers of a new
child care agency in New York seem to be caught: " ... Once we decided
to go [for child care status], then we had to go by all their regulations in
forming a board and bylaws and what not. As a matter of fact, we had the
bylaws sent back to us . . . three times because in the charter . . . we put
... things like 'advocating for community youth.' They didn't understand that. You don't have that in a child care charter [so) we deleted all
that kind of stuff. . . .
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"[Then] ... we took building commissioners to thirty-three apartment
dwellings here .. . before they would allow us to open up one single
group home. They said [there] was a major violation to every apartment
... [but] when I asked them to write down those violations on behalf of
[a] number of families living in the building, they refused . No, they were
only there because of child care, looking [at] the group home!
"I think we have one house still in operation that the State Board [of
Social Welfare] has not licensed . You just can't wait for them ... and
their regulations as to square feet between beds, and square feet in rooms ,
and number of full bathrooms and number of half bathrooms . You know,
if they would tell you actually that we don ' t want you here because [our]
worker is afraid to stay on the street . .. then I would live with that. . ..
Okay, we ' ll put a bodyguard next to your working people . That's a fine
way to keep you from achieving what is in need!
"It's horrendous! Some of these laws arc ridiculous . [For example, to
open! .. . these two units [ffor multiply handicapped children), their funding source would be different. They would be called ICFMRs .. . Intermediate Child Care Facility for the Mentally Retarded . Now the regulations for an ICFMR are all institutional regulations. We have these
youngsters living in two apartments on I49th Street. There's no way I can
make that apartment building meet the code for an institution . And at any
rate, none of those kids lived in an institution that met those regulations,
anyway . You know lit's as if] ... it's wrong for the community to be
doing it and yet the State and City never do it. So it 's Catch-22 . You have
to work through it . You know , you have to either ignore them and keep
on going, or try to work through as much of it as possible ."
OUTCOMES

GLIE is a success story, having rooted itself in a devastated urban
area, and grown from a single group home and budget of $75,000 to a
multifuceted, million dollur program over six years. The program has diversified from its originul focus on gang-oriented youth, growing somewhat by happenstance in a decentralized mode into new dimensions of
services . But the themes are still fundumentally troubled youth and the
community of the South Bronx .

ANALYSIS
The social chemistry which results in the birth of a new agency is a
multifaceted and complex phenomenon- usually a combination of conscious intent and fortuitous circumstance. In the case of GLIE, there were
some fortunate occurrences, most particularly a timely suggestion that
GLIE could begin operations by affiliation with an established agency.
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This idea, although accepted with reluctance, accelerated (if not simply
made feasible) the birth of GLIE. However, it had little influence on its
eventual fonn.
The environment in which GLIE developed, on the other hand, was inauspicious. Certainly there was a host of legitimate social problems to address in the South Bronx, and there were new opportunities emerging for
support of child care services to older, runaway, and handicapped youth.
But there was a great distance to be bridged between the opportunities
and the reality of services.
Primarily, therefore, the emergence and early growth of GLIE is attributable to the bold and risk-taking, yet pragmatic behavior of its primary
entrepreneur, Sister Lorraine Reilly. Her willingness to force the issues
and test and challenge the bureaucratic constraints, sometimes overstepping the bounds of technical legality, was instrumental in overcoming the
odds against successful enterprise in the devastated environment of the
South Bronx. This risk orientation is a product of the distinctly and intentionally independent and unencumbered style that Lorraine Reilly personified.
Much of GLIE's organizational form also reflects Lorraine Reilly's
style . Program units are small and decentralized because this allowed
Lorraine freedom of action, and keeps each unit close to the grassroots,
where Lorraine thinks they belong. A variety of programs have emerged
because GLIE has been attuned from the beginning to expressions of need
from the Bronx community, but also because some sources of funds
(e.g., federal runaway funds) offer the prospect of loosening the bind of
current funding agents (e.g., the local child welfare system) and permitting more discretion.
Finally, the GLIE experience reflects the tensions that inevitably arise
when an enterprise founded in advocacy enters the regulated, bureaucratic environment of social service delivery . For GLIE the trade-offs between the advocacy and service delivery missions were apparent from the
beginning, as GLIE was forced to separate from CLUB and drop its explicit advocacy orientation. Subsequently, the leaders of GLIE had to
swallow hard many times, accepting constraints such as oversight by St.
Dominic's and compliance with rules and regulations on services and facilities that inhibited a quick response to perceived service needs in the
community. In essence, GLIE had to learn how to become part of the service producing establishment without losing the energy that had sprung
from its idealistic roots .

Jewish Board of Family
and Children's Services (JBFCS)
PRECIS
In February of 1978, the Jewish Board of Guardians (JBG) and the
Jewish Family Services (JFS), two large social service agencies belonging to the Federation of Jewish Philanthropies (FJP) in New York City,
merged to become the Jewish Board of Family and Children's Service
(JBFCS) . The merger was prompted by the retirement of the executive director of JFS, but occurred against the background of a long history of attempted mergers of FJP-affiliated agencies . Arrangements for the merger
were worked out jointly by the two agencies over a two-year period,
overcoming various points of resistance. Through this merger, however,
JBFCS became one of the largest social service and mental health agencies in the country.

THE ENTREPRENEURS
The process of merging JBG and the JFS involved the efforts of many
people at the staff and board levels of the two organizations. Various
committees and subcommittees were formed to explore the numerous issues and concerns associated with the merger, and to negotiate the parameters of the arrangement.
Although .there is a history of "merger talk" among social service
agency members of the Federation of Jewish Philanthropies, the specific
chain of events leading to the JFS-JBG merger began with Sanford (Shep)
Sherman, Executive Director of JFS . Mr. Sherman was contemplating retirement and identified that juncture as a unique opportunity to pursue a
merger. He broached the idea with Jerome Goldsmith, Executive Director of JBG . JFS and JBG would merge and Goldsmith would become the executive of the new agency .
Shep Sherman was a career social worker and administrator, but
throughout his career, he kept his hand in teaching and in practice . He
was an adjunct faculty member of three schools of social work in New
York City, has given courses and seminars in various other universities
and agencies, has been a member of the editorial boards of two professional journals, and has written extensively on his own . Thus, despite his
127
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long administrative career, Sherman candidly admits that his heart has
been in teaching and practice.
There are strong similarities but also great differences in outlook between Sanford Sherman and his JBG counterpart Jerome Goldsmith .
While not a practitioner, Goldsmith is also much the scholar, having
earned a doctorate in education, had several university teaching affiliations, and written numerous articles in professional journals . But unlike Sherman, who has been clearly ambivalent about his administrative role, Goldsmith thrives on his work as an executive.
As chief executive of JBG, Goldsmith followed a pattern of program building and reform, and in the process increased the agency's operating budget from some $5 million to over $12 million in a 13-year period. He views himself as "an engineer of human services" and enjoys
"thinking big" and translating grand ideas into programmatic initiatives .
He also enjoys the political give and take, inside and outside his agency.
that is required for successful enterprising.
Jay Goldsmith says, half-humorously, that he sometimes regrets not
having gone into show business, which he once had the chance to do . But
his professional career has nonetheless provided him with the opportunity
to occupy center stage, while at the same time allowing him to utilize his
creative and political talents to dream grand designs and put them into
practice.

THE ORGANIZATION
With representatives of the Federation of Jewish Philanthropies
playing a background role, the process of merger required the painstaking
deliberation of the two organizational marriage partners, JBG and JFS.
While similar in some ways- as Jewish-oriented social service agencies-these two agencies exhibited more differences than similarities.
Some of these differences represented complements which strengthened
the rationale for merger. Others represented potential conflicts that required resolution to permit merger.
The strongest complements lay in the programs and services of the two
agencies prior to 1976. JFS was primarily a community-based counseling
agency which provided various services to Jewish families, including crisis intervention assistance, mediation service, homemaker service, legal
aid, and family life education . JFS's program also included a rehabilitation service for offenders in correctional institutions and on probation, a
therapeutic summer camp for children ages 7 through 11, and a Joint
Passover Association which gave supplemental income allowances· to
Jewish families at Passover holidays . Overall, JFS defined its purpose:
"To meet social and mental health needs of Jewish families and individuals ... of the city utilizing a broad spectrum of services: guidance, coun-
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seling, psychotherapy, as well as homemaker and other material adjunctive services."
JBG, on the other hand, was a "patient -oriented" agency, attuned to
the needs of emotionally disturbed children . Its services included residential facilities such as the Hawthorne Cedar Knolls School and associated
group homes, Geller House (detention services), the Linden Hill School
(for emotionally fragile youngsters), and the Phoenix School (for serious
delinquents); plus a number of day treatment and day care programs; and
specialized facilities such as the Henry lttleson Center for Child Research
and the Madelaine Borg Child Guidance Institute.
In theory, the "preventive" family therapy-oriented JFS complemented the treatment-oriented JBG rather well, providing an overall spectrum of required services for troubled families and children . The complementary quality seemed reinforced by certain common elements as well,
including the emphasis on staff training and therapeutic mental health services of both agencies .
JFS cared for some 40,000 families per year, while JBG served 10,000
children . The complements and overlap in caseloads of the two agencies
are nicely summarized in a 1976 memorandum: "In the large middle, JBG
and JFS caseloads overlap ... . At the extremes, caseloads may differ,
but never in opposition. For example, at the extremes the Madelaine Borg
Child Guidance Institute of the JBG will directly treat borderline psychotic children; JFS does not. JFS, on the other hand, has under treatment
single adults living alone or childless marri,ed couples; JBG does not.
However, in the large middle . . . there are similarities: l) families including children with habit or conduct disorders, neurotic traits, etc., are
abundantly represented in the caseloads of both JBG and JFS; 2) adolescents ... are similarly a large concern of both agencies; 3) both agencies
provide consultative mental health services to nurseries, day care and
community centers, and schools; and 4) both agencies offer preventive
services in the form of parent education and adolescent guidance groups .
"In the in-service training pro_vided for their staffs ... there is a core of
teachable expertise derived from clinical experience and staff 'experts'
(in the JBG, there is child development and child therapy; in the JFS,
family process and family therapy) . For staff training in complementary
or corollary modalities (for JBG, family therapy; for JFS, child development and therapy), each agency has had to tum to 'outside experts.'"
Still, there were certain areas of potential conflict deriving from program orientations. Given JBG's more sophisticated treatment programs
and residential institutions, JFS might fear being relegated to the status of
an "outpatient division" of the new agency. And given JFS's particular
focus on Jewish families, compared to JBG's more nonsectarian orientation, JFS might anticipate the erosion of its services to the Jewish
community.
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Basic differences characterized the two agencies' sizes and financial
positions. A JBG prepared memorandum of early 1977 notes: "Total expenditures of JBG were $12,376,000 compared with $4,097,000 for JFS
(fiscal year 1975). In other words, JFS is about one-third the size of JBG .
. . . [However] a comparison of JBG outpatient services with JFS, excluding the management and general expenses of both agencies shows
that JBG's expenditures in this area were $3,693,000 vs. JFS's

$3,527,000."
Jay Goldsmith provides further comparison: "JFS [had) . .. a 4 million
dollar budget, primarily in outpatient services. JBG had .. . a 12 million
dollar budget with a lot of residential and outpatient services . The JFS
had 77 percent of its money from private philanthropy (mostly from] the
Federation .. . . The JBG had about 73 percent of its money from public
agencies ... mostly public service contracts ... [and J 18 percent from
the Federation [and other philanthropic contributions]."
Of particular relevance to the merger, Goldsmith continues, "JFS had a
2 million dollar endowment and JBG had a million dollars worth of debts .
That was not a good combination." Some of those affiliated with JFS
would worry that its endowment would be used up bailing out JBG . (See
Risks and Constraints below.)
The JFS, with its counseling orientation, brought roughly 80 social
workers to the new agency, more than JBG. JFS also employed about a
dozen psychologists and psychiatrists. But in this category and other staff
categories such as teachers and child care workers, JBG far outnumbered
JFS . Goldsmith provides an overview: "There were more caseworkers
. .. from the JFS side .. . in the outpatient services. There were more
[from] the residences and all other categories .. . from JBG. There were
long-term, old-time, well trained clinical people in the JBG . There were
more young, lesser trained . .. in the JFS, except for the top [administration]. There was a more formal structure in the ... JBG, and a more ad
hoc structure . . . in the ... JFS ... "
Of particular relevance to the merger, there was no immediately obvious successor to Shep Sherman within the administrative ranks of JFS,
while Goldsmith of JBG was regarded as a leading executive in the local
voluntary sector. Thus the question of leadership for the new agency
would not be a serious issue. However, at other levels of the organization, the staffing of positions would be troublesome. Both agencies had
active boards of trustees whose officers coveted their status . And both
agencies had field offices distributed throughout the city, some of which
would require consolidation. The task of meshing the two structures
would be a delicate one (See Risks and Constraints below). As Louis
Lowenstein, first Board President of JBFCS diplomatically writes in the
1978 Annual Report: "Not only did the rationale for merging our organizations have to be explored, but we had to deal with the separate agency
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egos and pride in their past accomplishments . The Jewish Board of
Guardians and the Jewish Family Service represent, collectively, two
hundred years of service, and any effort at reshaping service delivery had
to be approached with sensitivity to their histories and philosophies."

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS'
Early 1976-Shep Sherman initially explores the idea of a JFS-JBG
merger with Jay Goldsmith at an informal luncheon meeting.
Spring, 1976-Sherman and Goldsmith meet at Goldsmith's initiative. Goldsmith indicates a positive response to the merger proposal and
the two executives make plans for further exploration . A joint meeting of
executives and board presidents of the two agencies is held. Agreement is
reached to explore the possibility of merger, and the Federation of Jewish
Philanthropies is alerted to this possibility.
May 20, 1976-A meeting of JBG's Professional Executive Committee is held to discuss the merger proposal. Various issues are raised by the
JBG management personnel.
June, 1976-Goldsmith and Sherman circulate a memo discussing the
rationale for merger with JFS, which indicates that the board presidents of
the two agencies should appoint a joint committee of the boards "to begin
the initial exploration of the issues raised in this memorandum and others
which may be indicated as the committee proceeds .. . . "
July 14, 1976-Goldsmith asks the Executive Committee (of the
Board of Trustees) of JBG to state an interest in exploring a merger with
JFS. The committee authorizes a subcommittee of the board to explore
the issue .
December, 1976-A joint meeting is held between staff of JBG and
JFS to discuss the merger proposal. Various issues are raised in an exploratory discussion.
January 18, 1977-The subcommittee on staff of the Executive Joint
Merger Committee meets to review various merger-related issues including staffing patterns, clientele, training and other items.
January 31 , 1977-The subcommittee on finances of the Executive
Joint Merger Committee meets to review fiscal aspects of the merger.
February 16, 1977-The merger proposal is discussed before the fu ll
JBG Board of Trustees. Previous meetings and discussions are described
as "purely exploratory" and the Board is asked to indicate policy direction. Issues are discussed but no decisions are reached.
April 6, 1977-The JBG Executive Committee meets. The results of
several joint JBG-JFS meetings are reported by the Executive Subcom'This chronology is based primarily on minutes kept by JBG.
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mittee to explore merger. Enthusiasm by senior professional staff and
concern by JBG trustees are also indicated.
April 27, 1977- A meeting of the JBG Executive Subcommittee on
Merger is held . Goldsmith reports that he has met with the JFS Board,
noting several areas of interest and reservation by that board. The subcommittee votes to recommend to the full Executive Committee that JBG
go forward with formal negotiations for merger with JFS .
May 4, 1977- A meeting of the full JBG Executive Committee is
held. The April 27 vote of the subcommittee is noted, issues are discussed, but no resolution is reached .
June I, 1977-JBG Executive Committee meets again . Discussion of
issues continues. The Executive Committee then votes to "approve the
merger in principle," and to authorize the Board President to commence
negotiations .
June 20, 1977-The full JBG Board of Trustees considers the recommendation of its Executive Committee and votes to "approve the merger
in principle ." The Board President is directed to appoint a committee to
negotiate with JFS and to develop a definitive merger plan. JBG merger
subcommittees are subsequently designated, at the board and staff levels,
to review financial, personnel, program, and policy aspects of the
merger.
July 12, 1977-A meeting of the JBG Merger Committee is held .
Various structural questions including the organization and finances,
board structure, and name of the new agency arc discussed . The committee agrees to retain paid legal counsel to prepare a corporate charter and
by-laws. On the same day, the Joint JBG-JFS Merger Committee meets
for the first time . Issues of parity and structure of the new agency are discussed . A subcommittee is designated to study the issues of board and executive committee structure for the new agency . The executive directors,
Goldsmith and Sherman, are asked to draft how the programs of the two
agencies would be integrated, as a first step to overall consolidation .
Summer, 1977 - This period is described by Goldsmith as the "summer of discontent," when proprietary feelings on both sides become ignited and the merger almost falls apart .
November 2, 1977- The JBG Executive Committee approves a plan
by its merger subcommittee, for merger.
November 9, 1977- The full JBG Board of Trustees adopts the merger plan of its Executive Committee.
November, 1977- A proposal for $45,000 is submitted to the Greater
New York United Fund to help defray the costs of merger.
December 7, 1977 - The JBG Executive Committee meets and reports
that the merger plan has been approved by both agencies, and that legal
counsel has prepared the necessary documents of incorporation. Gold-
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smith reports having met the staffs of JBG and JFS and having discussed
the merger with various City officials.
December 20, 1977-A meeting is held between representatives of
JBG, JFS, and the Federation of Jewish Philanthropies to discuss the
merger, especially the financial issues. On this same day, JBG and JFS
senior staff meet to draft details of the board structure of the new agency.
January 4, 1978-Goldsmith reports to the JBG Executive Committee
that the NYS Department of Education has approved the merger, and that
approval of the State Department of Mental Hygiene and Department of
Social Services and the Attorney General's Office are pending. Official
declaration of the merger is described as "imminent ."
January, 1978-Notices of intent to dissoJv,e JFS into JBG, and subsequently change name to JBFCS are filed .
February 8, 1978-The merger of JBG and JFS is officially proclaimed. The process of reorganizing staff, facilities, governance, and
operation is begun .
CONTEXT

Merger is not a new topic for social service agencies in the New York
Jewish community . As far back as the 1930s, the Federation of Jewish
Philanthropies has encouraged merger discussions among its recipient
agencies. Since the 1950s particular interest in merging JBG, JFS, and
the large foster care-oriented Jewish Child Care Association (JCCA) has
arisen from time to time. For FJP, merger represents greater efficiency
and simplicity in the funding of child-oriented social services. As Jay
Goldsmith recalls the history , discussions more frequently focused on
JBG and JCCA: " . .. [The merger idea) has a long history .. .. [ln]l950
. .. [for example) there was a visit from the JFS leadership to the JBG at
that time to discuss cooperative efforts and ·mergers .... It has come up
periodically ... because the logic of merger had been pressing for many
years . .. . The question has always been- why- doesn't the Federation
have ljust] one Jewish children's agency that deals with all the issues of
treatment and placement? ... That was the logic, the unyielding logic
that always pushed us . But ... [there was a] fundamental lack of sympathy ... 'sympatico,' between [JBG and JCCA] that would make it impossible for them to merge. There was a competitiveness ... an uneasy
... relationship between ... the two agencies ... [which] didn't aid the
merger climate . . . . [Nonetheless j, Federation, each time, even in the
middle of our discussions with JFS, convened [a meeting] of JBG and
JCCA to see whether that [JCCA-JBG] merger could be once again revived .. .. "
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Shep Sherman recalls the debate of the 1950s: "[In] the 1950s, ... a
study was done . . . and a proposal for the merger of a number of agencies
[was made] . . . . That . . . recommendation was debated and argued and
(ultimately] fell apart. Then once or twice in the interim between those
years and the present .. . there were starts made in this direction ... .
(Once it was proposed that] . . . the three largest agencies [JBG, JCCA,
JFS] merge .. .. That fell apart in a heroic, epochal meeting in which the
three boards of directors got together for a meeting chaired by a Supreme
Court Judge . ... One after another, the child care people ... the foster
care agency people ... condemned the merger. . .. So that fell apart, and
... [so] the thing . .. has been cooking for sometime but (has been], of
course, on the back burner (of late] ... . "
JBG, JFS, and JCCA have not been the only focus of FJP sponsored
merger activity. For example, in a June 1976 memorandum, staff of JBG
note: "Federation itself recognized decades ago, the value of such integration of services by creating the Westchester Jewish Community Services
and the Jewish Community Services of Long Island, both of which encompass in a single agency the functions now carried out separately by
the JFS and the JBG in the (city] . . . . "
In the 1970s, the rationale for consolidation and merger was strengthened in the city by the decline of the Jewish population in that locale, as
well as the darkening picture of philanthropic and public funds . The
aforementioned I 976 JBG memo notes: " . .. For the immediate future,
the prospects are that there will be severe contraction of the real dollars
available from public as well as philanthropic sources . . .. (And] the
movement out of the inner city of great numbers of Jewish families continues; the number of Jewish aged will continue to rise; there is a continuing decline in the birth rate and therefore reduction in the number of
'young' families." Therefore, the call for merger by Federation reflected
the need to consolidate service arrangements in view of a declining population and resource base, and an emphasis on greater efficiency.
Paralleling the economic and demographic imperatives, the trends in
the social service and mental health professsions also now favored the
service concepts around which the JBG-JFS merger revolved . Two interrelated points are worth noting. First, in the child care field specifically,
there was a marked movement toward preventive programming, i.e.,
working with families to reduce the need for residential placement. A
February, 1977, JBG memorandum notes, for example, that, " .. . preventive service projects aimed at 'saving families for children' .. . have
been put in place in (various) children's agencies including our own ... .
These are essentially family services utilizing a variety of social services,
clinical input and supporting services to help maintain children in their
own homes ." The implied reference here is to the 1973 New York State
Preventative Services Demonstration legislation which provided funds for
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such programs on an experimental basis. That l.egislation was stimulated
by a general hue and cry in the foster care field that children have
been placed outside of their homes too often, and too many for long
periods.
The second, more general trend in professional thinking has been towards comprehensive models of treatment services . As the June, 1976,
memorandum explains: " ... There has been an extraordinary expansion
of knowledge in the field in the past several decades . The foundations for
the separate identities of the JFS and JBG were laid many years ago, in a
different era. . . .
"In the past two decades there have been radical changes in our intellectual approaches to social welfare and mental health work . The model
of the individual patient and client treatment that had been based on physical medicine was considerably altered by our increased understanding of
the interrelatedness and interdependence of family members, both in
healthy development and in illness. Treatment has increasingly focused
on the family unit and on other natural group associations ... . The children's agency. like JBG. tries to cncompuss the family unit ... in its
work with children; the family agency, like JFS, increasingly includes
children ... in its work with family units . . . .
" . . . Throughout the country there has been a trend in the broad mental
health field toward merger of family and children's agencies . In hospi tals, for example, family psychiatry has moved into departments of child
psychiatry and into the training of psychiatric fellows and residents . Federal and local legislation, guided by the best of professional thinking, has
increasingly favored the creation of comprehensive structures for delivery
of service. Similarly, mental health practitioners are becoming increasingly more appreciative of the way in which individual and family disablement interlocks, and are calling for integration of practice
specialties."
During the period when the JBG-JFS merger was being deliberated,
the parties were aware of the current interest by the professional community . In December of 1977, Jay Goldsmith reported to his executive committee that the merger would be "watched . .. by agencies all over the
country since there is a great interest now in the kind of model which we
will be developing .. . ."And in January of 19'78, Goldsmith reported to
the same committee that, "The imminence of merger .. . has also elicited
a great deal of interest in the academic community, and we have been approached by a number of universities . . . about affiliation with the JBG
Educational Institute ... ."
Thus, it is no surprise that the JBFCS Annual Report should indicate:
"The decision to merge .. . is based on the conviction that the comprehensive model of service, which is being adopted by medical and social
welfare organizations throughout the country, is the most effective way to
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deliver needed social welfare and mental health services to the community .. .. "

CHOICES
Although its deliberation transpired over a relatively short period of
time (approximately two years), the merger of JBG and JFS passed
through a number of distinct stages of decision-making. Initially, Shep
Sherman broached the proposal. Later, board members and staff of the
two agencies, after substantial study and debate, resolved to merge
- based on general principles of agreement on the shape of the new
agency . Finally, the particular parameters of the new agency had to be
worked through, in the process of actual consolidation and redirection, by
multiple staff committees under leadership direction of Jay Goldsmith.
The basic decision to merge was affected by numerous issues and concerns, almost anyone of which could potentially have sunk the proposal.
(See Risks and Constraints below .) However, the merger initiative was
also driven by its fundamental logic, and by a good sense of timing by
Sherman, Goldsmith, and members of their respective organizations .
By early 1976, Shep Sherman was contemplating his retirement. This
personal milestone required some decisions germane to the future of JFS .
Clearly, alternative leadership would have to be found, but there was no
immediately obvious successor in the JFS ranks. The existing deputies
were either too old or ill, or otherwise unsatisfactory to the JFS board.
The options were to initiate a search for new leadership, or to explore a
merger. According to Goldsmith," ... They [JFS] really didn't have anybody in sight, and after looking around they decided there was nobody in
the field that they wanted. So the idea of merger occurred to them, with
an agency where it had been discussed in .. . years past and discarded . It
had ... been in people's minds from time to time , as a possibility, [so] it
was decided to explore it on their part and we were approached .... "
According to Sherman, the search for alternative leadership was never
really serious: "If the merger hadn't come off . . . we would have looked
for an[ other) executive. Who knows? I hadn't thought that far ahead ... .
I don't know that there would have been any other merger that would
have made the same sense. . . . "
To Shep Sherman, the merger became a central theme around which he
would design his retirement. It was, in his view, a "golden opportunity;
... the reason why the other merger [attempts] really fell apart was the
competitiveness of the executives as to who was going to be on top, who
was going to be dispensable . . . . And I said, 'Listen, we have got a
golden opportunity here. I am retiring. I want out of the administrative,
executive ranks . I'll support ... your being the executive. So there is re-
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ally no need for us to compete on this thing. We are free to look at what is
really desirable . . . without competitive, sibling rivalry.' And that is
what made it possible . I would say that single thing ... made it possible,
because it made it possible for the executives, Goldsmith and myself, to
mobilize sentiment on our boards, in favor of it. ... "
The merger idea had a compelling quality to both executives . Goldsmith would be offered the leadership of a significantly expanded agency
with a wide-open agenda, while Sherman could exit with a flourish, having made an important contribution to his field and his agency . As Sherman saw it, these two loyalties were consistent and intertwined, despite
the fact that JFS's identity might be submerged by consolidation:
" . . . The Jewish Family Service was my professional forum and home
for over 30 years, and I have felt an attachment. [Feeling otherwise]
would be like not caring what happens to your family . .. . I was deeply
concerned about ... the continuity (and] ... the identity of the Jewish
Family Service, even into the merger ... not as an agency (per se] ...
but the tradition and the work that it is doing, and the reputation it has .
. . . [The merger was a] last creative task ... (to] approach more the concept, the holistic concept of ... individuals and families . Children and
family, family and children .. . I think being able to help the agency into
a new phase of creative ferment . . . hell . . . that is exciting and rewarding, and gratifying .. . ."
Once merger talks got underway between JFS and JBG, with FJP as an
interested third party, the whole gamut of merger possibilities was raised.
Federation again introduced the possibility of merger between JBG and
JCCA, the two child care agencies, but to no avail. (The mutual disaffection still obtained .) The possibility of a looser affiliation between JFS and
JBG, short of actual merger, was also raised by JBG board members . For
example, in a meeting of the JBG Executive Committee in November,
1977, it was reported that JFS was pressing JBG for a commitment to
merge, and that JFS was not interested in affiliation arrangements . At
least from the JFS side, the comprehensive services model and the issue
of executive leadership made merger compelling, and Jesser alternatives
unattractive.
For JBG there were also some immediately compelling arguments for
merger. One factor was JBG's strong identification with residential treatment, particularly through its large and long-established institution at
Hawthorne. Such a heavy emphasis on residential care was fast becoming
a liability in the view of modem mental health and social service professionals, as well as a financial burden. Addition of JFS 's network of community-based services would give the new agency a more balanced image
and set of resources .
For example, at a May, 1977, meeting of JBG's Executive Committee,
Goldsmith indicated that " . . . merger would give us an opportunity to
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improve services for adolescents . . . without keeping us a prisoner of
Hawthorne ." And at a June, 1977, meeting of that committee, it is again
noted that the merger would help free JBG "from its dependence on
Hawthorne ."
Another factor for JBG was JFS's strong financial position, particularly its private funding base. This was viewed as a potential source of
leverage to attract more public matching funds to the agency, through the
mental health system. JBG, with its mental health system accreditation,
would be in a strong position to take advantage of this leverage .
A January, 1977, joint board subcommittee on staff reports in its minutes that, "The merged agency with its Federation's total grants of
$4,500,000 will be in the position of drawing down, based upon the 50
percent Department of Mental Health Services (DMHS) match formula, a
very substantial amount of dollars to expand mental health services for
children and families . ... "
An April, 1977, JBG memorandum also mentions the possibility of
" . . . Expansion of service through utilizing the expanded pool of philanthropic dollars to match public funds." Similarly at an April 6, 1977
meeting of the JBG Executive Committee, it is noted that "the resources
of the merged agency would be helpful to the City, which could use these
as matching funds ... and help draw more state dollars .... "
And more than simply provide additional financial leverage, the addition of JFS might provide JBG, already a major agency, with additional
overall "clout" with the City and State . Such a consideration was raised
by one board member in a February 1977 meeting of the JBG Board of
Trustees, who noted the need for a stronger negotiating position in view
of the "fiscal crunch" imposed by the City, State, and U.S. And, in a JBG
memorandum of April, 1977, the possibility is noted of "increased influence over public policy as a result of the size and prestige of the merger
agency."
Finally, given JBG's constant flirtation with operating deficits, the
possibilities of cost savings and the addition of an endowment "cushion"
that might result from a merger with JFS had to be attractive to J.BG.
Consolidation of field offices and gradual shi ting away from residential treatment might ease the financial problems created by the Hawthorne
operation, which Goldsmith describes as a "sinkhole" for dollars.
Of course, JFS would be wary of having its endowment go down
this drain (see Risks and Constraints), but JFS's financial strength was a
distinct "plus" for merger, as seen by JBG .
From the viewpoint of both agencies, the attraction of merger was ultimately tied to the adaptation to a new service-delivery model. For example, Jay Goldsmith is frequently recorded as saying that " ... if one were
to initiate an agency today . .. [given] what we know about families and
children . .. [we] really would not set up two separate agencies.
[Thus] there was an impelling logic to bring it together . . . . "
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Substantial discussion centered, throughout the merger talks , on the
nature of the new model. The June, 1976 JBG memorandum on exploring
merger asks whether a medical model, with generalists at intake and specialists (child or family therapists, residential treatment) called in as
needed, should be adopted . A February, 1977 memorandum mentions
four alternative models for services integration, offered for consideration
by Shep Sherman.
However, the speed with which a new model of service delivery would
be implemented was uncertain . The June, 1976 memorandum also asks:
"Should corporate merger be followed by an interim structure, which ·
would provide for an integrated administrative structure but with a dual
service structure (family service and child guidance) to determine
whether, to what extent, and for which services full integration would be
useful?"
Jay Goldsmith says he was committed to an "integration" rather than
"umbrella" structure from the start, but was cautious on the timing: "I
was very committed to a merging of the processes of family and child
treatment. I didn't want to have a family department and a children's department, which is what most Jewish family and children 's agencies have
in this country . l wanted to merge the process, and we're doing it by
tracking patients into service with a different kind of intake disposition
conference and the utilization of criteria that select one to fifty modes of
treatment at different times, depending on people's needs . . . .
"[However], the decision at the beginning was to make no changes,
not to rock the boat. . . . There are certain requirements that have to take
place. There are certain departments that logically ought to be questioned
as to where they fit into the new service . .. . We ' re aware of them, but
we're not moving on them right away ... There are a lot of issues . That's
one of the things the Policy and Scope Committees [of! the board and the
professional staff will be doing ... [namely] reviewing which services
are still pertinent to our mission and which ought to be modified or eliminated. And we will do that."
Deference to the personnel within their respective organizations seems
to have been a hallmark of strategy which Sherman and Goldsmith
adopted to accomplish the merger. Having resolved to pursue the merger
proposal, they were quick to involve their boards of trustees and their
staffs in the deliberation process . Indeed, the executives took a back seat
at first, until momentum developed . This cautious, low-key approach was
in recognition of all the sensitivities involved in restructuring two large
agencies . Board member and staff positions and personalities would have
to be rearranged. Feelings could be hurt, and fears would arise . (See
Risks and Constraints below .) A merger would have no chance unless the
various personalities became an integral part of the decision process .
Thus, beginning with the executive committees of the boards of trustees,
and blossoming outwards to include staff, numerous committees were es-
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tablished to explore various issues and implications of merger, and various joint meetings were held between board members and staff members
of the two agencies during the period of merger consideration. (See Chronology of Events .)
Given this cautious, participatory approach, there was, of course, the
possibility that more problems would be raised than solved by the various
committees . Indeed, at a May, 1977 meeting of JBG's Executive Committee (of the board) concern was expressed that it would take several
years to work out all the problems . Hence two stages of consolidation
were identified-legal corporate merger, followed by gradual merger of
agency operations. In general, as merger discussions proceeded, the feeling grew that (legal) merger should be accomplished as soon as possible,
before everything started to unravel. At the foregoing May, 1977 executive committee meeting, Goldsmith stated that he did not wish to delay
any longer because "we are now at the right psychological moment." As
Goldsmith recalls: "There were dozens of meetings that took place with
board and staff ... that kept coping with the issues , but one thing that
came clear [was that] if you're going to do it, the longer [you wait], the
more anxiety develops and the more differences begin to·emerge. It began
to be very clear that if we have enough confidence (that] this is the way
we want to go, we'd better do it fast. Otherwise, it'll break up .... We'll
work out the differences later. The board and the key leadership among
the professional staff made that decision quickly. Otherwise [it] would
have fallen apart . . . . "
Finally, as the merger of two nonprofit organizations, JBFCS would
logically incorporate as a nonprofit itself. This was always assumed and
never an issue . Nonetheless, the preferred mode of merger would have
been to dissolve the two original nonprofits (JBS and JFS) and to incorporate a new one (JBFCS). This would have reinforced the preference (especially by those associated with JFS) that the venture be viewed as a
marriage of equals . However, technical considerations associated with
JBG's mental health accreditations required dissolution of JFS, its absorption by JGB, followed by a name change . (See Risks and Constraints
below .)

RISKS AND CONSTRAINTS
While the arguments for merger eventually won the day, there was a
myriad of concerns by board and staff members of both agencies, any
number of which might have undermined the venture. There were, for example, certain recognized risks associated with loss of effectiveness,
identity, and independence of the original agencies, and administrative
overburden or financial problems for the new agency .
For those associated with JFS, which had been mostly reliant on pri-
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vate funds, there was the feared loss of autonomy of a new agency heavily dependent on public dollars, i.e., "that we would not [any longer] be
. . . free agents," as Shep Sherman puts it. Part of the concern here involved the more sectarian program of JFS, and whether the greater
proportion of public funding would mean a loss of that identity and orientation. For example, the observation was made in discussion by JBG's
executive committee in June, 1977 that the City might pressure the new
agency to serve more non-Jewish children . Throughout the merger deliberations the divergent orientations of JBG and JFS were recognized . For
example, a June, 1976 statement on exploring merger asks: "With JFS
serving a predominately Jewish caseload and JBG serving a significant
proportion of black and Hispanic children, what result would the "mix"
have? How could merger be directed to assure service to a larger sum total of Jewish clientele? How could the joint service not only maintain but
significantly enlarge its role in the general Jewish community and in the
various Orthodox Jewish communities?" The January, 1977 minutes of
the joint (board) subcommittee on staff go on to state: "The issue of the
JBG serving a large number of non-Jewish clients and JFS serving a
predominately Jewish population was discussed . Although the implications inherent in this will need further exploration, it was pointed out that
both agencies consider themselves sectarian services giving preference to
Jewish applicants ."
An April, 1977 JBG memo also raises the possibility that: "There
might .be dilution of service to the Jewish community ." The concern over
loss of identity with, and service to, the Jewish community, was not
solely confined to the question of public funding, nor was it solely the
concern of JFS. Jay Goldsmith explains that staff of the Federation were
also worried: " .. . We ... had been meeting with Federation and talking
to them about this [merger! . . . letting them know of our intent. Shep and
I visited [the director) ... and he gave us his blessing and said it was a
wonderful thing . . .. Meanwhile, the rumors began to creep back to us
that [other FJP staff said that), 'It's not such a good idea because JBG is
more nonsectarian in style and will contaminate the Jewish orientation of
JFS .. .. "'
Of a more personal nature, there was fear on the JFS side, especially at
the board level, that the identity of JFS personalities would be swamped
by the merger. Shep Sherman notes candidly:" ... What was unspoken is
that some of [the JFS trustees! felt that they would lose identity in such a
larger board. They were much bigger [fish] in a small pond than they
would be in such a larger pond .. .. And (there were] .. . similar sentiments among the staff. . .. [In addition) . . . . in the staff ... the single
strongest opinion was that the JBG orientation toward [institutionalJ practice would corrupt the JFS practice (and) they ... would become . .. less
respected and valued [and] have Jess status .. . ."
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From the JBG side there was an even stronger concern that the merger
would risk a loss of effectiveness and decline in professional reputation.
In a meeting of the JBG executive committee in July, 1976, one board
member expressed the fear that the merger "may require total restructuring of the services of the two agencies with the risk that you may be giving up two good things that work, for one possible [one] that won't." In
April, 1977, a board member assetted that perhaps JBG should stick to
psychotherapeutic treatment of children with emotional disorders and not
take over a whole range of social services . In May, 1977, a board member expressed the fear that the size of the new agency and the preoccupation with merger will deleteriously affect attention to the quality of services . Perhaps the fears of a few JBG trustees were best summed up by
one of them at an executive committee meeting in February, 1977 . That
trustee stated his opposition to merger and said he felt strongly about
JBG's tradition of "quality and greatness" which he asserted was due to
the fact that "we cut our cloth to a narrow pattern . . . [of] clinical treatment of the emotionally disturbed child ."
An important area of risk, especially as viewed by Goldsmith and others affiliated with JBG was the prospect of an administrative morass in
trying to fuse the two agencies together, and overburden in attempting to
administer the new creation . Of particular concern to Goldsmith were the
potential divisions at the board and staff levels . Speaking of the new trustees from JFS, Goldsmith observes, " . . . I was engaging in a relationship
with a whole new set of power people . .. !some of whom] came with
high levels of suspicion and even some distrust. . . . Some were supportive but generally I would say that was an area of real . .. concern,
having to reestablish yourself with that group and prove your capability .
"[The merger) gave me a split board .... [It) carried a great division
within the board and within the professional staff, of those committed to
outpatients in community-based treatment and (those committed to 1residential treatment . . . [it was a] highly unstable professional situation
with a great deal of suspicion on both sides. The assumption ... by my
own [JBG-derived) staff .. . that I would betray them and their commitments to child treatment, and suspicion by the newer staff for me .. . that
.. . I wasn't either acquainted or representative of their particular specialty . . .. "
Aside from the prospect of having to mediate internal divisions, there
were more straightforward concerns over the potential administrative efficiency of the new, larger agency . An April, 1977 memorandum, for example, wonders if: "The increase in the number and variety of services
located under the umbrella of the merged agency might pose administrative problems." While in June, 1977 a JBG trustee questions whether the
larger "conglomerate" agency would become too impersonal in style . At
a May, 1977 meeting of the JBG executive committee, Goldsmith notes
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administrative changes were already underway, consistent with the reorganization that would be necessary for merger. In particular, Goldsmith
says he had already planned to be less involved in the day-to-day detail of
operation but "closer to the concepts affecting the development of programs and services ." Hence the merger reorganization would not be substantially different from the goal of the current reorganization of the JBG
to "create a management system that will free me to deal with issues of
policy ."
Nonetheless, the merger represented an administrative risk if only
from the viewpoint of additional wQrkload in carrying it through. Moreover, Goldsmith was not unmindful that administrative problems of the
kind potentially involved in merger, have unseated other well regarded
executives:" ... There are a few key executives in this town who have
disappeared in the last few months, who had very secure positions and
were very important people . That's always a possibility that ... your job
is not secure and you may not survive . And while I guess I've never really thought about that as a serious potentiality, sure, it's slipped through
my mind . . . . "
One set of risks of explicit concern to both agencies was the financial
base of the merged organization . While there was some thought that
merging a heavily government -funded agency with one that depended primarily on philanthropy represented a beneficial "hedging of the risks" associated with the two sources, much more attention was paid to the concern that the Federation might reduce its combined allocation to JBG and
JFS. After all, Federation's interest in the merger was largely in saving
money, and the new agency would represent an obvious target as the
largest single recipient of FJP funds . The fear of cutbacks by Federation
is noted in the June, 1976 exploratory statement and later in an April,
1977 memorandum, as well as in the minutes of numerous meetings . In
the minutes of the January, 1977 meeting of the JFS -JBG Merger Finance
Subcommittee, it is stated: "The question of continued Federation fund ing was of extreme importance to the Committee since, if the two agencies were to merge, Federation's grant to the combined organizations
would represent 20 percent of the total funds distributed by Federation to
all agencies . The Committee expressed concern that, in this contracting
climate of philanthropic giving, Federation might not be able to fund the
newly merged organization even at current levels; particularly, in light of
its intent to reduce the levels of grants for the next fiscal year by I percent
and substantially thereafter."
Goldsmith reiterates the point and goes on to say, "We .. . had a ...
meeting with Federation in which the (board) presidents of JBG and JFS
and .. . the professionals met with ... leadership ... in Federation and
(we asked] . .. if we did merge, what guarantees did we have [for] Federation not to use the occasion to reduce our grant. .. . [ We talked ofl the
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concerns that .. . [we] would have ... about being vulnerable as a large
target for future cuts, with Federation's merger coming up with UJA ...
in the not too distant future .... And, of course, we gained a lot of reassurances . . . [and) Federation encouraged us to move ahead. . . ." Loss
of Federation support turned out to be a well-founded fear, as it ultimately became difficult to hold FJP to its promises of continued funding
at the old levels.
In many ways, implementing the merger was analogous to threading a
needle-numerous constraints defined a narrow opening through which
the venture had to be guided . Some of these constraints were simply annoying but necessary legal and logistical requirements. Others, however,
represented delicate balancing of competing demands from various organizational factions .
Goldsmith acutely observes that " ... mergers cost money. In the long
run they save, [but) in the short run they cost money ... ,"To assist with
the costs of merger, the JFS and J BG applied to the Greater New York
(United) Fund for a $45,000 (matching) grant in November of 1977 . The
proposal lists $90,000 worth of short-run merger expenses including legal
fees, integration of business operations, consolidation of program reporting and data processing, relocation of facilities, staff reorganization and
orientation materials, and public relations materials . The actual merger
process would, of course, transpire over a period of time. It is interesting,
therefore, that there was some earlier discussion over how the merger
costs should be paid for in terms of the treasuries of the original agencies.
In July, 1977, a JBG board member (who, not surprisingly, was an opponent of merger) proposed that a holding company be set up and each
agency pay separately for costs of the merger. However, this idea was rejected in favor of immediate consolidation of fiscal resources.
Legal requirements represented a tricky, but ultimately not very serious bound on the merger process. Various approvals needed to be obtained from the New York State Departments of Social Service, Mental
Hygiene, and Education and the Attorney General.
A basic concern was that JBG should not lose its mental health system
accreditation . Jay Goldsmith explains that JBG technically had to absorb
JFS (rather than merge with it) and then change its name, in order to accomplish this assurance: "[A] real merger meant both agencies would
have had to go out of existence and a new one would have come into existence . That would have meant [that] the JBG would have lost all accreditation with the Joint Commission and all of its psychiatric clinic licenses,
and [would have] had to start all over . A clumsy and difficult process,
so the JFS merged into the old JBG, and then the JBG ... changed its
name .... "
As Goldsmith goes on to observe, this technical process was not
widely understood, and carried with it some trauma: "When that notice
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appeared in the papers, that JFS was being dissolved, all hell broke loose.
Social workers who never read the financial page. read the financial page
that day . . . . Nobody ever reads those notices of dissolution of corporations . . . but they saw that."
The really serious potential trauma that constrained the evolution of the
merger pertained to parochial and proprietary feelings on the part of
board and staff members of both organizations . The issues included use
of JFS's endowment funds, job security, structuring of the new board,
and the general concerns for parity in structuring the new organization .
Two intertwined issues that arose through the merger discussions were
the questions of JBG's Hawthorne Cedar Knolls residential facility, and
the use of JFS 's endowment funds. The concern of some affiliated with
JFS was that its funds would be used to finance the JBG deficits emanating from the Hawthorne "sinkhole" and other JBG residential facilities .
As noted by Shep Sherman, there was the. further concern by some JFS
people " ... who had had some experiences with .. . institutions that .. .
Hawthorne {as) an institution that has delinquent kids ... (had an undesirable] image in the community . . . [that] would rub off . . . on the
JFS." For their part, some trustees of JBG argued that JBG should get its
own house in order, and proceed with the needed renovation of the old
Hawthorne physical plant, rather than divert its energies on the merger.
This view is expressed by JBG board members at various meetings in
1977 . But in a June, 1977 meeting of the Executive Committee, Goldsmith said that Hawthorne needs restructuring, but he didn't think it
should interfere with the merger.
That dissipation of the JFS funds was a serious problem is confirmed in
the January, 1977 minutes of the Joint Merger Finance Subcommittee:
"Another concern appeared to be whether, by virtue of the merger, the
JFS funds would or could be dissipated . Both Mr. Hirsch and Mr. Cohen
tJBG trustees) indicated that once the merger had been effected, there is
no way to protect the funds of either organization against the creditors of
the merged organizations but that JBG's assets are substantial (although,
primarily of a fixed nature) and they are not in any danger of claim by
creditors in the foreseeable future although such is always a possibility ."
Ultimately, the merger agreement required that JBG provide moral assurance that JFS funds would not be used simply to cover JBG debts . According to Goldsmith, " .. . Whether the money would be dissipated in
JBG's residential centers which are notoriously expensive and have huge
deficits . . . created a tremendous problem . ... JFS ... people had a
great deal of concern about that. . . . We had to give guarantees that
money would not be touched . While it was to become an asset to (the)
new agency, the moral position of the new agency would be to leave
those dollars untouched for several years, and not (have it] go toward
solving deficits from the old JBG problems .. .. "
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Even more anxiety centered on the question of job security . Care was
taken, for example, to keep the employees ' union informed, beginning
with a meeting in July of 1977 . Although the staff anxiety was pervasive,
both Sherman and Goldsmith agree that the greatest resistance came from
middle management-the division chiefs and program administrators
who were uncertain about their futures in the new agency . As Goldsmith
summarizes it:" ... The difficulty is not in the top and not on the bottom.
It's where it always is ... in the supervisory group .... That's the group
that's most resistant to change .... "And as Sherman notes, the problem
was particularly acute for JFS administrators: " ... No matter how many
times we said that there were no plans to cut anybody's head off, the administrator .. . in JFS looked over at [his counterpart in] JBG, and saw
that JBG had a bigger structure ... [and] felt, 'What the hell is going to
happen to me?'"
The issues of job security and redefinition of responsibilities had to be
dealt with delicately. There were, as Goldsmith emphasizes, "endless
meetings" between top management, supervisors, line staff, and the
union . The union was guaranteed that there would be no job loss (layoffs) . The administrative consolidation was dealt with in various ways.
Sherman explains how the borough directorships were handled: " ... We
solved it in a variety of ways. In the Bronx we ... have co-directors . In
[another case] one of the borough directors was [fired] .... In [another
borough] one of the borough directors was promoted to another position . . . . "
If staff problems required sensitivity and delicate maneuvering,
structuring the board of directors of the new agency required even more
diplomacy. Shep Sherman explains: " ... There were one or two powerful people in the JBG board and similarly in the JFS board [who] if they
had been crossed the wrong way . .. could have blocked [the merger] .
. . ."Goldsmith observes further that" ... The board's been very difficult. The sensitivities are much greater ... ."The problems at the board
level involved reconciling reluctance to abdicate prestigious positions ,
with the need to consolidate and provide for parity between people from
JFS and JBG.
The July, 1977 Joint Merger Committee featured a discussion of board
structure for the new agency in which JFS trustees insist that the merger
be a merger of equals . There was also sentiment expressed by one JBG
trustee that greater representation [be granted to JBG] by virtue of its
size. What is worse, Goldsmith recalls that JFS trustees were actually insulted early in the summer of 1977 by the "high hattedness" of some of
the JBG trustees: "[In June, 1977] .. . there was a crystallized resolution
[of] ... intent to merge .... Then the board committees ... met at the
top and everything began to go bad. Until we reached July, 1977, it
looked like the merger was going to be dissolved . . . . Several of our
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board members at JBG offended the board members and trustees at JFS
... [because] the JBG crowd looked at [JFS] as an addition of an outpatient service . .. [while] the JFS was very sensitive to the fact [that 1this
was a merger, not a takeover . . . . "
There was sentiment expressed at the July meeting that all present
board members should be allowed to participate in the new board , but
there was no agreement on how that board should be structured . By November, 1977, the issue of representation appears to have been resolved
in favor of equality between the two agencies .
This seems to have been only the beginning of the resolution, however. The question of who would fill key positions on the board generated
considerably more friction . Goldsmith explains: [We faced the question
of] who was going to be president. ... We had two presidents ... and
neither was going to step down . ... Finally, i.t was agreed that [the JBG
president] would step down ... (the JFS president! would go on for a
year . . . and after a year [the JBG president[ would then become president for four years .
" ... The former JBG president ... now has resumed his role of presidency .. . and as the time has gone on since the merger, it's apparent that
a lot of strength is in the old JBG .... It looked like all the key ... spots,
by virtue of age and power, . . . were emerging as ex-JBG people . .. .
JFS people were getting more and more uncomfortable with that. .. .
[The ex-JFS president] got very stubborn about that and [insisted that) the
Executive Committee (Chairman) ... which is the (second] most prestigious position ... had to be an ex-JFS activist. [However, the manj who
had been Chairman of that committee for 12 years didn't want to get off.
... [The president] finally .. . had to tell him to .. . step down and leave
room for an ex-JFS person .... But in the process, we've had to juggle
all the committees, the budget committee, the balance of power ... ."
Essentially, successful adoption and implementation of the merger
meant operating with deference to the sensitivities of people, staff, and
board members, whose conflicting loyalties required solutions within narrow bounds of compromise . Goldsmith himself had to work at overcoming distrust of affiliates of the old JFS while attempting to revise the loyalties of the JBG people without offending them .

OUTCOMES
More than a year after the formal merger, the consolidating and deliberating and rearranging were still going on . There were still numerous
staff committees and meetings to deal with the issues of program and service delivery. But the ferment seemed healthy. Speaking of experimenting with a new format of disposition conferences, Goldsmith seemed
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to aptly characterize the whole state of agency affairs: " .. . [There's] still
a tremendous number of bugs but what we've got is a sense of openness
and candor and battle."
There apparently has been learning and adaptation by staff from each
of the former agencies. For example, Goldsmith notes that "there's more
psychiatric input into the new JFS cases . . . . " At the same time, " ...
[we're] incorporating a quick response .. . in order to give service to all
clients who come to you. That's a new concept for the old JBG people
who really shunned short-term therapy and only thought in terms of longterm care."
Not all parts of the two former agencies have been equally affected by
the merger. According to Goldsmith, "It touched the (JBG] residential
centers least [initially]. But training has been consolidated ... (and] all
the [old JBG] outpatient units have changed dramatically . . . because
we've introduced the notion of a quick response .... We've (also) introduced priorities into Jewish families [cases], with children having first
priority . . . :"
In those parts of the agency where merger was the most visible, reactions were mixed. As Goldsmith sees it: "It's different in different offices. In (some offices] there's a compatibility and excitement that's very
good . [Elsewhere] the JFS crowd feels it's being swallowed up by the JBG
. . . (orj the JBG crowd ... feels it's being swallowed up by JFS . .. . It's
a function of numbers and personalities of the staff directors . . . . It's
more the personality of the people who where chosen to head up each of
[the] boroughs ... ."

ANALYSIS
The merger of JFS and JBG was a venture of mutual interest to executives Shep Sherman and Jay Goldsmith. To Shennan, whose heart was in
practice and in scholarship, the merger represented a contribution to his
field-a chance to set into motion the development of a comprehensive
model of service delivery to troubled families. The merger also solved a
potential leadership problem at JFS, and allowed Sherman to retire with a
flourish. For Jay Goldsmith, the merger presented a whole new opportunity set. He would be the center in a whirlwind of new activity. And, as
the executive of the huge and financially comfortable new agency, he
would have the chance to indulge in grandiose new plans for the reform
of service delivery to children and families and to develop new institutional affiliations and arrangements for melding theory to practice .
The merger proposal was born into a receptive institutional and professional context. For years, the Federation had encouraged consolidation
among its agencies, but with little recent success in the family and chit -
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dren's service field. Nationwide the merger of family and children's
agencies was also in vogue. Such movement had both economic and political roots . As in the New York City context in which JBFCS emerged,
traditional client populations were shrinking while philanthropic dollars
were also becoming more scarce. Consolidation of partially duplicative
and complementary systems made sense . Furthermore, social work and
mental health thinking about child care was moving away from institutional care and from the "child as patient" model, towards a more preventive, family-focused approach. At the same time, family services were
being encouraged to incorporate children into their purview and clinical
specialties into their practice. A comprehensive, multimodal family service model represented the current state of the art.
The merger of JFS and JBG succeeded because it was carried out sensitively, with a good sense of timing. The fact that one of the executives
was retiring solved a major potential obstacle to merger, i.e. , the choice
of chief executive. Still, other sources of pride and uncertainty had to be
massaged. The two executives shrewdly engaged their boards and staff
into early and detailed participation in merger deliberations. They took a
back seat, go-slow stance in order to acclimate their organizations to the
concept. At the same time, once all the issues were on the table, the executives, Goldsmith in particular, wasted no time allowing the momentum
to slow or the merger to unravel. Rather than work out all the details prior
to legal merger, the organizations were urged to merge first, and to continue the process of consolidation over time.
The sensitivities and proprietary feelings of members of both organizations defined a set of constraints within which merger could be worked
out. Parity was a key guideline. It was to be a merger of relative equals in
which power and responsibilities would have to be properly disbursed .
Care would also have to be paid to the use of funds . It would not be acceptable for the funds of one agency to bail out the deficits of the other.
The case of the JFS-JBG merger appears to provide some general insights on the character of at least one class of nonprofit organizations .
Certainly this merger experience shows some nonprofits to be ones in
which power is dispersed . Chief executives arc powcrful - ce11ainly merger is all but precluded if these men cannot be accommodated - but they
cannot alone carry out such a venture. Unlike a profit-making corporation
where an executive-owner might easily have his way, the nonprofit director must mollify the personal and proprietary feelings of his board members, as well as deal with staff, union, donor (Federation) and client (government) concerns . In the case of JBFCS, it was a semipublic process in
which political as well as executive (management) skills were required.

Florida Sheriffs Youth Fund, Inc.

PRECIS
The Florida Sheriffs Youth Fund (FSYF) is a nonprofit umbrella organization which administers three residential child care programs - a Boys
Ranch, Girls Villa, and Youth Ranch - in three locations in the state of
Florida. The genesis of FSYF is the Boys Ranch, founded as a nonprofit
agency in 1957 by the Florida Sheriffs Association as a facility to help
troubled boys . After some initial years of struggle, the sheriffs hired
Harry Weaver as executive director of the Ranch . Under Weaver's leadership, the organization has grown from a three-cottage operation with a
$100,000 budget, into a thriving multimillion dollar enterprise . Most outstanding of all, the organization runs entirely on privately derived revenues and has become highly sophisticated in the arts of fund-raising, estate planning, and public relations.

THE ENTREPRENEURS
The Florida Sheriffs Boys Ranch was established in 1957, several
years prior to Harry Weaver's involvement. By the time of its 20th anni versary celebration in 1977, the organization had enshrined in folklore its
modest beginnings, including lhe sheriffs and early donors who conceived and implemented the idea . There were several key characters including former Sheriffs Ed Blackburn and Don McLeod who learned
about Farley's Boys Ranch during a trip to Texas in 1955, and brought
back the idea to the Florida Sheriffs Association; Sheriff Hugh Lewis
who led the effot1 to organize the venture, including the securing of land
and funds; Tommy Musgrove, a wealthy farmer who donated the land for
the ranch; J .L. McMullen who led a committee of Suwannee County
civic and business leaders to persuade the sheriffs to undct1ake the ranch
on the site of Musgrove's land; and Sid Saunders, president of the Sheriffs Association during the period the Boys Ranch was begun . These men
were instrumental in launching the Boys Ranch, but it was a very small
and shaky enterprise when Harry Weaver took over at the helm, late in

1961.

Harry Weaver's early career gave little formal indication of a managerial orientation . Prior to 1956, he was employed as a teacher and counselor at a state training school for boys . From 1956 to 1961 he was a fed/53
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eral probation officer based in Tallahassee. But Weaver's administrative
abilities must have been recognized by the sheriffs . He did, for example,
organize an industrial arts program at the training school. But his apparent motives for coming to the Boys Ranch in 1961 were very traditional.
After being on the corrections end of the spectrum of youth problems,
and perhaps being discouraged by it, he wanted to do something on the
"prevention side ." The Boys Ranch was intended to help straighten kids
out before they became seriously involved with law breaking.
Weaver's style is much easier to describe than his motivations . He is
very patient and soft-spoken, and also very disciplined. He is extremely
meticulous in his attention to detail, whether it be records of children, encounters with potential donors to the agency, or keeping the agency's finances. Weaver is also a crafty and calculating personality who sees precisely how his attention to details fits into an overall managerial strategy.
And if Harry Weaver is anything, he is a very skilled salesman .
The salesman in Weaver comes out best when he is describing his approach to getting people, especially elderly donors, to contribute to his
agency . It's hard for the outsider, even incredible, to think of getting
someone to make a financial contribution as an exercise in helping the donor. But Weaver has carefully thought through this approach and seems
both sincere and convincing: " . . . I learned .. . (to get] . .. satisfaction
[from] .. . helping people to give .. .. In order for a person to give, to
give freely, they have to be comfortable in their giving . . .. We encourage visits to our program . . .. People want to be a part of it and see it.
They don't want to know the gory details of the kids' lives. They know
they have had a rough time. They know the world today is very difficult
for teenagers . ... But they like to be a part of something that's good,
wholesome. . . ."
More than just making people feel comfortable about their giving,
Weaver sees himself providing a direct service to the donors. Referring to
one elderly woman who visited the ranch: "lt is obvious that she is in the
middle of her estate planning, and that she needs help. She resists help,
however, because in fact she and her husband have done quite well
through the years with their investments. I have encouraged her to contact
the trust officer, but she has stayed still since she has no relatives and no
real close friends. . . ."
Referring to another lady who accompanied the first on her visit: "Now
. . . I was not unmindful of the lady who stayed off to the side . . . because she had the same problem . So once she started to leave, I thanked
her for coming, and I asked her if she was on our mailing list . ... [It
turns out] not only is she alone, no relatives, [but] she's a real estate broker . . . . Never said a word during our conversations . So what have we
got? We've got two friends; they have got at least five friends each. They
will be our friends .
"Now we don't do that just for the money. We do it because it is the
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right thing to do . People are very uncomfortable in their approaching
death if they do not have their finances in order. They may be prepared
for death emotionally from the standpoint of religion or what have you.
But if they don ' t have a will, and if they don't have their finances in order, they are miserable ... . We work at this, and we are going to do
more, because we think it's a service. And we think it 's important
whether they give to us or not."
If Weaver is the skillful salesman, he is also a patient, pragmatic problem-solver by nature: "I enjoy working with people and some people say
I enjoy problem-solving, and seem to thrive on ,crisis. I don't know that I
do . I rather think that I'm a person who thinks that every problem can be
solved, or a reasonable solution can be reached . . . . "
Weaver's upbringing in a poor but dedicated family , sensitized him to
the value of enterprising and hard work. And as an FFA (Future Farmers
of America) member and a student of industrial arts in his youth, he developed a love for building and growing things, which seems reflected in
his enterprising behavior later on. Just as important, the care he received
from relatives under somewhat adverse economic circumstances, helped
develop his sense of responsibility for the welfare of others . As he puts it:
"[It's] how we used to do it when the bam burned and everybody pitched
in and built the barn back for the neighbor. Or, if the neighbor got sick,
everybody pitched in and harvested the crops . . . . "Thus, while Harry
Weaver is a product of his pat1icular family upbringing, he is also a product of the general social milieu of the southern United States- a conservative-minded American who advocates the traditional values .
Yet in many ways Harry Weaver is an enigma. He professes little interest in money, or power, or prestige, yet in moderate quantity he has
achieved all these . He seems seriously concerned with helping others, yet
he is curiously unmindful of the needs of minority children . And, it is difficult to distinguish between Weaver the salesman and Weaver the social
worker, especially in his approach to elderly donors .
It is clear that Weaver is an enterpriser and a builder, who enjoys
challenges-seeing what he can do - and enjoys seeing the fruits of his
labors, be they physical constntcts, organizational structures, ·or programs of various kinds. He is essentially pragmatic, always behaving in a
rational, carefully thought-out manner, and in accord with basic conservative principles. In a wider sense, however, he seems curiously valuefree : "I don't know what my philosophy of life is. I just live everyday ."

THE ORGANIZATION
The genesis of FSYF lies with the Florida Sheriffs Association, the
professional group of chief law enforcement officers in the 67 counties of
Florida. In Florida, the sheriffs are locally elected and are influential political figures, both locally, and, as a group, statewide. Association with
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the sheriffs has been a major factor in building the image and the support
for FSYF.
The sheriffs' role in FSYF has changed gradually over the years. At
/the beginning (I 957), it was the initiative of the sheriffs that succeeded in
establishing the Boys Ranch . Apparently, the notion of sponsoring a
ranch that could "straighten out" young boys before they got into serious
trouble, by providing a substitute for poor home environments, was attractive to the sheriffs as an image-builder for themselves. The sheriffs'
image was a negative (punitive) one with respect to youth -- they were
the officials associated with juvenile arrests, detention, and referTal to
state training schools . The ranch would put the sheriffs in a more positive
light, trying to help youth and prevent juvenile law breaking.
The sheriffs had little money of their own, but they were able to use
their status to generate resources in a manner that was to set precedents
for the pattern of future fundraising. They solicited both cash, land, and
in-kind labor and goods, and hit upon the ideas of issuing honorary memberships to the Florida Sheriffs Association for $15 fees, and designating
generous donors as "lifetime members." In the 20th anniversary issue of
The Rancher, State Representative Ed Blackburn, Jr., of Tampa (one of
the original sheriffs involved with the ranch), recalls the early activity of
the sheriffs: "The Florida Sheriffs Association was broke . .. [but] at the
sheriffs' January 1957 winter meeting in Key West, the sheriffs voted
that an Honorary Membership Program be made available to a selected
group of good citizens in each county. These good people responded.
"Six months later, the 1957 Summer Conference of Sheriffs was held
in Sarasota and . .. as a result of the Honorary Membership Program, the
Association had a bank balance of $7,000.
" .. . the Associated Press picked up the story and Sheriff Hugh Lewis,
of Suwannee County, picked up the ball and ran with it. [Farmer] Tommy
Musgrove had earlier given ... some 20 acres ... to the Elks Club for a
youth project; he still owned the 120 adjacent acres to the south. So Sheriff Lewis persuaded the Elks and Tommy to give this 140 acres for the
ranch.
"Suwannee County civic and business leaders got together a prestigious committee, headed by J. L. McMullen, to lobby and persuade the
sheriffs to name this as the site for the proposed ranch.
"This committee made the formal proposal to the sheriffs' directors in
St. Petersburg in August, 1957. The sheriffs accepted, and the idea
mushroomed . Adjoining this land to the east were two abandoned farms
that were in estates, about 550 acres in all, and $31,000 cash would buy
them both . " . .. With the help and advice of the local committee, together with the help of the two friendly Live Oak banks, the sheriffs
bought these farms for cash .
"The banks lent the sheriffs $13,000 for a total of $26,000, the sheriffs
added $5,000 of their $7,000 ... ."
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Blackburn adds, prophetically : "Sheriffs, of necessity, have lots of
friends or the badge of authority and honor that they wear wouldn't he
theirs, but all of a sudden they found themselves surrounded by a host of
new friends who were attracted when they learned that sheriffs had a virtue they had never before seen .... Countless friends, both new and old,
responded. Money, materials, and labor were donated . Committees were
formed in service and civic clubs and churci.Jes all over Florida . . . . "
The legacy of these early years remains strong. The sheriffs sti ll play
an active role as directors of FSYF. The image of their association with
FSYF continues to be a major asset for fund-raising, and much of the
style of that fund -raising has been retained . The sheriffs also form an integral part of the intake process . Admissions to the FSYF campuses work
through the local sheriff offices . Indeed , Harry Weaver is careful to preserve the close relationship with the sheriffs : " ... I work through them.
[If] I have a speaking engagement in an area. I don't go to that speaking
engagement unless I let the sheriff know I'm coming . I invite him to be
with me, and he generally is with me .... When ... our social workers
.. . go into an area, they go to the sheriff's office, if nothing other than
to check with the secretary. . . .
"Each kid comes to the sheriff. That application has to be signed by the
sheriff. . . . We like for them !the sheriffs! to stay involved, to know
what's going on .. .. "
The sheriffs muddled through the early years of Boys Ranch, going
through four resident directors, and floundering financially . before Weaver was hired. Weaver came in 1961, on the condition !hal changes
be made in the organization, including the nature of the sheriff's involvement in administration . Weaver recalls, " .. . We were on a shoestring . . . . If it weren't for non-cash gifts, such as beef and things,
... we wouldn't have survived . .. . When I came we could go no way
but up ... . We were at rock hottom . . . .
"[The sheriffs! wanted to do something productive . .. and they also
wanted to do something to help their own image. If you're for motherhood, you can help your image, so it was a nice combination . Now, what
they did not see .. . were the problems they were going to have running
the program. The idea was great; it sounded beautiful, but running an
under-financed program . .. was very difficult. ... At the same time that
was all they could do, because that was all the money they had .... There
were certain changes they would have to make in order for me to come .
. . . Finally they made certain changes . .. . The board agreed that I could
develop a budget and spend money within that budget and I could sign all
checks . ... "
Essentially the sheriffs agreed to take a less direct role in administration, and a more advisory role as directors. The ranch became more its
own organization, rather than an extension of the Sheriffs Association .
Furthermore, the sheriffs agreed to restructure the board as well. Weaver
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explains: " ... In the beginning, by virtue of .. . lthej limited funds, you
had to draw on resources from local people [the Suwannee Civic leaders]
. . . and they sort of controlled the organization. . . .,
Weaver insisted on a more statewide, representative board structure.
The board structure that emerged required a majority of non-sheriffs, with
appointments to the board made by the Board of Directors of the Florida
Sheriffs Association . The FSYF Board then elects its own officers, and of
course, the executive director (Weaver) is responsible to the board .
Despite the continued formal control by the sheriffs over selection of
board members, Weaver says, "It's not a problem . . . [although) that
probably will change one day ."
Weaver is generally pleased with his board members whom, he says,
are selected because they ". . . will agree to attend meetings and be involved .... That's the main [thing). The sheriffs have been very good
about this. They want to appoint those that will be involved and take it
seriously . You don 't have to be wealthy . You don't have to be a president
of a corporation .. .. We have a CPA .... We like to have a doctor on
there . . . [but) the main thing is to have a professed interest in child care,
and what we are doing . .. ."
Nonetheless, the financial contributions of board members have been
important to FSYF. As Weaver recounts: "Let 's put it this way . One of
our board members ... built the medical clinic ... and he built the administration building at the [Girls] Villa. Another one . .. built this lmaih
administration) building and another one was instrumental in building the
cafetorium ."
Fund-raising has become a science at FSYF. Yet here, too, the roots in
the Florida Sheriffs' original efforts, as well as image, remain strong.
Amazingly in this era, FSYF operates (except for tax exemption) without
a penny of government funds. Large individual donations or estates
willed to the organization have been responsible for much of the capital
stock (land, buildings , etc.), but Weaver insists that solicitation of small
donors, bequests, and in-kind contributions of goods and services are the
backbone of the operation . Of all revenues received in fiscal year 1977,
55 percent represented direct gifts, 27 percent were from bequests, 11
percent from income on investments, 3 percent from sale of livestock and
farm produce, and 4 percent other. Most of the gifts (roughly 75 percent)
were from individual donors , as opposed to organizations, and most of
these, Weaver says, are from "$15, $20, $25 donors." (The list of donors
numbers some 30,000!) It is in this area pat1icularly that the imagery and
appeal of the sheriffs is most effective. As Weaver states in a 1978 speech
to the National Association of Homes for Bo ys: "We are fortunate to have
been founded by and associated with the Florida Sheriffs Association. It
links us with law enforcement which has a natural appeal to a wide segment of society . The concept of sheriffs helping youngsters with prob-
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!ems to grow into law-abiding citizens rather than following the path that
leads to delinquency and crime is even more appealing ."
In summary, despite the fact that the sheriffs' direct financial role in
FSYF has been minimal (on the order of $80,000 annual contributions in
1979, out of roughly $4 million in total annual revenues), the sheriffs
continue to be an integral part of FSYF-through their direct and indirect
representation as directors, through their involvement in intake, but most
of all through the imagery of "honorary sheriffs" and other public relations aspects of sponsorship.
The corporate structure of FSYF has become considerably more complex, since 1961 . But even on this dimension there is a legacy of the early
years. Most important is the fact that the Boys Ranch was originally established as an itTevocable trust which meant that the organization could not
expand past its original purpose, e .g . , it could not accommodate girls.
Nonetheless, the organization did expand to a multiple-campus operation, adding a Girls Villa in 1970, and a Youth Ranch for coed sibling
groups in 1976. These additions were made by the cumbersome means of
setting up separate corporations, each governed by a similar board structure and headed by Weaver as executive director . A separately incorporated Youth Fund was similarly organized in 1973 to carry out fund-raising
and administrative coordination. In 1977, through court action, the provisions of the original trust were broken and the various pat1s of the organization consolidated into a single operation, the Florida Sheriffs Youth
Fund , Inc .
At the outset in 1961, Harry Weaver established his firm control of the
organization, and this has become increasingly important as the organization grew into a multi -campus enterpnse with abundant physical and financial assets and a wide-ranging system of patrons and donors . Weaver
is particularly proud of how he modernized management control . The records of some 30,000 donors are automated and " we will have everything
.. . vehicles, children's records, inventory, the whole bit .. . on the
computer."

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
1957 - ... Boys Ranch is founded by the Florida Sheriffs Association,
with 140 acres of donated land and $5 ,000 in cash . The adjoining 562
acres is purchased with a $26,000 mm1gage .
January , 1959·-- The first collage is built and staffed , and the first
group of hoys is admitted .
1960- Two more cottages are added. Total population of boys is now
32, with an operating budget of $114 ,473 .
1961 -- Harry Weaver is hired as executive director of Boys Ranch .

160

CASEBOOK OF MANAGEMENT FOR NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS

1960-1970- Boys Ranch expands to six cottages, 100 boys . Many additional buildings are added. The operating budget grows to $400,000.
1970-Florida Sheriffs Girls Villa is organized in Bartow, Florida,
200 miles south of Boys Ranch .
July, 1972-Girls Villa opens with 8 girls . It expands to 24 girls and
three cottages by 1978. Ultimate planned capacity is 40 girls and 5
cottages.
1973-Fiorida Sheriffs Youth Fund, Inc. is established to carry out
the administrative, accounting, and fund-raising activities of the Ranch
and Villa.
April, 1976-The Youth Fund purchases land and buildings for a third
campus, the Youth Ranch. The Youth Ranch opens in 1979 for 10 children (sibling groups). Ultimate capacity is 30 children, housed in three
cottages.
October, 1977-The Ranch, Villa, and Youth Fund are merged into a
single corporate body called the Florida Sheriff Youth Fund, Inc. At this
point the total operating budget is $2 .3 million, with a net worth of $12
million. Harry Weaver, previously executive director of each of the separately incorporated units - Boys Ranch, Girls Villa, Youth Ranch, and
Youth Fund - becomes president of the merged corporation. The boards
of directors of the separate units are consolidated .
CONTEXT
The locale of northern and central Florida provided particularly fertile
soil in which to grow an enterprise of the kind that FSYF has become.
There are several reasons for this. First, the state is politically conservative. Thus the notion of contributing to an organization associated with
the function of law enforcement is a popular one . The sheriffs are a symbol of authority to be respected and admired .
In addition, the idea that FSYF operates Without government funding
is also particularly appealing to a conservative constituency. As Weaver
views his donor constituency : "These people want only to share their responsibilities with other individuals and families . They strongly object to
the intrusion of governmental entities into their responsibilities . FSYF
cultivated support of the conservative element, by appealing to the voluntary, nongovernmental feature of its operation. As Weaver emphasizes:
" . . . Our donor family is . . . pretty much a conservative group of people .
. . . By and large it's the person who feels the government has gone too
far, that they give too much money away, that they waste money. It's the
Proposition 13 people. We tapped [into) them .. . a long time ago .. . .
We're extracting from these people funds that make them comfortable in
giving to a nongovernmental agency . ... [We emphasize) sharing, giving, giving of one's self and time, without being forced . .. to do it."
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A second relevant feature of Florida is its large and increasing concentration of elderly residents. Weaver himself discounts this factor, but it is
clear that the multitude of elderly has provided a lucrative market in
which to solicit bequests for FSYF. Such bequests constituted some 27
percent of income in fiscal year 1977. Weaver and his organization have
astutely recognized and exploited the fact that many elderly people need
help with estate planning. Thus FSYF staff have developed special expertise in this area. FSYF publishes brochures on the subject and Weaver has
spent a major proportion of his own time visiting with prospective elderly
donors.
A third aspect of Florida that has assisted FSYF is rapidly rising land
values. This phenomenon has had two effects . First, it has caused tax
problems for older land owners, making the donation of property to
FSYF a more attractive proposition. Second, bequests of property have
been a source of increasing wealth to FSYF, not only in terms of the
value of current assets, but income realized from sale of land and use of
land for commercial enterprises such as livestock and timber farming.
The character of Florida's criminal justice and child welfare systems is
another contextual factor that influenced the development of FSYF. The
early negative association of the sheriffs with the punitive aspects of juvenile justice has already been noted . Part of the difficulty here arose from
the dearth of alternatives provided by the State for residential care of children . State training schools (viewed popularly as prisons for kids) were
the only formal alternatives for delinquents. State funds for purchases of
service from private child care agencies, basically for foster care, were
also meager, although many of the 50 or so other voluntary child care
agencies in Florida, many of them church-affiliated, did receive such
funds.
Thus, in a sense, FSYF stepped into a partial vacuum focusing on
older, presumably predelinquent children, more than other agencies, and
developing a viable financial means of supporting such a program .
CHOICES

The basic decision to incorporate as a nonprofi1t organi7.ation was made
before Weaver's tenure as executive director. Originally such status provided the tax benefits to donors of the land·, cash, and other contributions,
needed to assemble the campuses and initial collages. Other alternatives
were essentially null. According to Weaver, the public sector was not a
viable option in 1957, despite the sheriffs' positions as government officials: ". . . Back then you really had little government funding in this
area . It was almost unknown .... "
Even after Boys Ranch was established, during the 1957 - 1961 period
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when the organization floundered , the public sector option was reconsidered: " . . . When they (the sheriffs] had so much trouble, they thought of
all sorts of alternatives . . . . They talked in terms of turning it over [to the
state] ... [but] ... there were not enough [sheriffs] for it .... "It can
only be guessed that the sheriffs had insufficient confidence that the state
would carry out the envisioned purpose of preventive programming; and
indeed they may have been philosophically opposed to seeking government involvement. ln any case, many of the sheriffs probably believed
there was still a chance that the Boys Ranch could be made viable as a
private venture.
According to Weaver, the profit-making sector was also a possible option. But again, this option violated the original intent. Weaver observes :
" ... I could have become a millionaire in profit-making .. . but it would
be with a different kind of youngster . It would be for the youngster with
parents of means , presidents' of corporations children and this sort of
thing .. . . We looked at that [profit-making alternative ] very carefully
. .. [But with] the kids that we take ... we don ' t even discuss finances
with a family .... First we determine ... whether the youngster needs to
come. Then if we accept it, and the parents can give a dollar a month, we
expect them to do that [but only) because that's therapy . .. . "
Within the framework of the nonprofit form, Weaver and the sheriffs
made some basic strategic policy decisions which enabled the agency to
stabilize and later to prosper. The most fundamental of those decisions
was the setting of priorities . It was decided that building the agency's fi nancial base would be the first order of business. Programmatic considerations would take a back seat. As Weaver puts it: " ... You have to have
money before you can do things . You see, that's always the dilemma .
. . . This conflict in a human services organization between fiscal people
and program people . But you have to recognize that you can have the
most beautiful plan in the world , and great ideas, but unless you have the
money to put them into effect, they're not worth anything . All you 're doing is dreaming ."
Given the financial imperative, Weaver' s plans were impressive, especially in an era of relative decline in philanthropy . His intent was to build
an endowment large enough to insulate the agency from adversity: "We
don't want to amass a lot of reserves ... We don't want to do like Boy's
Town ... but on the other hand, we have to make sure that we are protected in case of an adversity or disaster, or something like that. So we
are trying to come up with a formula that will say - with this many children, with this many fixed assets, such as buildings and equipment, and
so on .. . the reserve should equal this . And [we would) stay with that
formula ... [and not] over-extend ... [ourselves]."
Perhaps more impressive than the goal of financial independence is the
manner in which the agency chose to raise its funds. Unique advantage
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was taken of both the affiliation with the sheriffs, the conservative mi lieu, and the substantial elderly population in Florida, to develop a finan cing capacity focused totally on private giving. Weaver recalls that latching onto the particular donor groups at the beginning was somewhat ad
hoc, perhaps fortuitous, but having done so, the avoidance of government
funding became a requirement:" . . . I've always been asked . .. at speaking engagements ... 'Do you accept state or federal funds?' ... People
like this business of being able to do [things independent of government) .
. . . It's bred in them .. . the sheriffs and everybody . .. . "
Asked if racial attitudes have anything to do with avoidance of government funds, Weaver replies," ... No, it's deeper than that. It's the being
told what to do and how to do it. . .. You know what government funds
do . .. . Boy, they get you . As a matter of fact, the racial (factor] has
nothing to do with it ... [although it may have] years ago."
Similarly, FSYF chose to go its own way in fund-raising, independent
of organized charities such as United Fund. According to Weaver, "We
don't get involved in that. ... They've wanted us because we would be a
good representative in the United Fund . .. a good agency for them to say
that they support ... [but they don't give much money] and . . . first you
have to go through a lot of red tape. So it just doesn't pay us ."
Having restricted itself to its own private fund-raising, FSYF became
expert in various techniques, ranging from the collection, utilization and
sale of non-cash gifts, to personalized mass solicitation of small donors,
organized visits to the ranch, estate planning and solicitation of bequests,
setting up memorial funds, cultivation of the large donors by honorary
memberships and prominent display of donor names on campus streets
and buildings, elaborate coverage of donors in the agency's magazine,
and so on .
Significantly, the choice of private giving as the basic avenue of resource development, served to reinforce the basic policy decision to emphasize finances over program as first priority. While the FSYF child care
program certainly was more than adequate in terms of activity content and
physical amenities, program development played second fiddle . Compared to the planning that went into resource development, program planning was ad hoc. As Weaver describes the program: " ... We really [do)
not have a treatment modality .... I like to think of ours as PLT (Practical Living Therapy) . We have a little of all of it ... behavior modification ... group-guided interaction [etc.] . . .. It's a very practical ap proach. Had I been able to come up with . . . some definite treatment
modality of my own selection and development, l would have been more
comfortable . . . but 1 never did have it clearly in mind . ... "
Weaver and his staff were, in 1979, first getting around to an organized, systematic evaluation of their child care methodology and program.
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Not only was the child care program given a second order of attention,
but in many subtle and not so subtle ways it was shaped and influenced by
the focus on donors . The physical campuses are a positive manifestation
of this . They are kept clean and manicured, and constantly open for visitation and inspection. Just as conspicuously, however, every road and
building carries the name of a donor, and a luxurious guest cabin is
maintained.
But there are more troublesome influences also. The admissions policy
seems very conservative for an agency presumably designed to deflect delinquent behavior. There have been only a few minority group children,
forcing one to wonder if donors, some of whom Weaver admits were biased, would be turned off by too many nonwhite faces. And despite Weaver's observation that: "Our youngsters are a little more disturbed than
those in most of the other homes . . . . We are geared to the teenager.
They're more difficult to work with .... "The criteria of admissions, as
specified on the intake form require that the youngster" ... be of average
or above intelligence; not have been adjudicated a delinquent; be in good
physical health, have no severe personality problems . . . be recommended by the local sheriff." Furthermore, given the size of FSYF's budget, the agency was conservative in the numher of children it served.
(The agency served under 200 children in a given year.) Weaver says,
"We are trying to maintain the right number, for quality. We could care
for a lot more kids, but it would be just a mill . . . . "
The intake form also required that a child "agree to receive religious
instruction ." This stipulation is reflective of the general style of the
agency, not only for children but staff as well . Again, it all revolves
around the donors . Weaver is quite candid about this: "[Although ] we get
very little money from churches .. . we . . . have compulsory church
times . . .. We . .. require staff who live on campus to attend church ... .
We could not hire anyone with a beard .. .. They'd have to shave it off,
you see, because of the people that support [us]. And this has nothing to
do with the character of the person, but it's that identification .. .. We
can't have extremely long hair . It doesn't have to be as short as mine, but
we can never have that. ... Where you get your money, and how you get
it, dictates what you do and how you do things ... . "
Finally, the whole corporate restructuring from the original Boys
Ranch, to the umbrella Youth Fund, was closely related to fund-raising
considerations . Essentially, the original incorporation of the Boys Ranch
eventually proved too cumhersome and restrictive. This first became
clear with the undertaking in 1970 of the Girls Villa, under stimulus of
the Sunshine State Women's Chamber of Commerce. At this juncture, it
was apparent that broad-based support could be enhanced by service to
girls. (Later, programmatic considerations also indicated the need to provide coed care of sibling groups, leading to the Youth Ranch project.) In
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any case, such constituencies could not be addressed through the restrictive trust of the Boys Ranch, so Weaver and the sheriffs embarked on a
deliberate strategy of separate incorporations in order to accommodate
these constituencies in the short run, and make a case later, for consolidation and lifting of the restrictions. Weaver describes the circumstances:
" .. . People were partial to the Ranch, and there were those who were
opposed to starting the Girls Villa [but] . . . we had some real dissension
within the donor family as to whether to give to boys or girls .... And I
sensed that early . Of course, what I wanted .. . at that point [was to) have
one legal entity, [but] it [was) complicated by the fact that the Boys
Ranch was established under a charitable trust .. . [a) very difficult trust
to break.
" ... The Sunshine Women's Chamber of Commerce gave us $70,000
to get (the Girls Villa) started . ... Then (when) we received [donated)
funds we kept everything separate. We had duplication of everything . We
wrote separate checks, had separate bank accounts, and the whole bit. "
Part of the problem was solved in 1973, with the establishment of (another) separately incorporated Youth Fund . As Weaver notes in his 1978
National Association of Homes for Boys (NAHB) address: " ... In 1973,
we established a third organization (or legal entity) to provide 'an umbrella of support' over the Boys Ranch and Girls Villa .... The Youth
Fund . .. took on the responsibility for all major administrative, accounting, and fund-raising activities of both the Ranch and Villa.
"With three organizations (the Boys Ranch, Girls Villa, and Youth
Fund) in operation and a fourth (the Youth Ranch) on the horizon, some
type of move toward unification seemed wise . We already had three separate boards of trustees, three executive committees ... and three separate
sets of minutes .. .. We were doing three of everything . . . in spite of the
Youth Fund organization that we had established to eliminate duplicated
effort. . . .
". . . I had an ulterior motive in all of it. I saw eventually that the
Youth Fund would be the umbrella . .. . [So] we [had) three sets of everything ... cumbersome and bulky, and the circuit judge went right along
with [our arguments for consolidation) . . . . [Had] we tried to do that ...
with just the Boys Ranch [he ] would not have gone along with it."
RISKS AND CONSTRAINTS

Harry Weaver describes himself as a risk-taker. Indeed, his coming to
Boys Ranch in 1961 is evidence of this, as he gave up a secure, wellpaying job as a federal probation officer, which promised an early retirement and a good pension, to lead an enterprise which was on the financial
ropes. Having come to the Ranch, Weaver continued to take gambles.
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For example, during his early days at Boys Ranch, Weaver directly supervised FSYF's child care program, and he believes that perhaps the
riskiest decision he has made at FSYF was to move himself out of direct
programming involvement and into the fund-raising function: "I had trouble with it for a while .. .. I was very possessive of the kids and the program. I probably thought that nobody else could do it like I could . . ..
[But] we had to .. . make a choice. We had to have money .... [Nonetheless] I felt uncomfortable because it might have an adverse effect on
our income [too] .. . if we had problems, or some crisis ."
As noted earlier, another of Weaver's gambles was the gambit of separately incorporating the Villa and the Youth Fund, in the belief that the
courts would allow ultimate consolidation with the Ranch . He might have
been stuck permanently with the cumbersome multi-corporate structure.
Overall then, FSYF under Weaver undertook a number of significant
risks in the short run, in order to build a stable base and hedge in the long
run . It has been the basic corporate strategy of FSYF to build an efficient
organizational structure , backed by a sufficient financial reserve, to buffer the agency from whatever changes in donor behavior or governmental
regulation (e.g., tax exemption policy) may obtain in the future.
From the beginning of Weaver's tenure ( 1961 ), corporate decisions
had to conform to various institutional constraints. Some of these have already been noted . or implied. For example, the restrictive trust under
which the Boys Ranch was originally incorporated, required some organizational acrobatics to accommodate and eventually circumvent it. Prior to
consolidation , for instance, funds could not be easily moved between the
Ranch and the Villa, restricting overall flexibility in program and resource development.
Similarly, in the funding area FSYF had to Jive with certain restrictions, emanating from three sources- the marketplace, the sheriffs, and
the donors .
The marketplace has always been viewed as a source of fiscal discipline by FSYF. At the beginning of Weaver's tenure at FSYF, it was a
matter of avoiding bankruptcy ("It takes money to operate . . . you have
to pay your staff.") Later on, despite some calculated risks, expenditures
at FSYF continued to be rigorously justified .
While on balance, association with the sheriffs has by far been a net asset, this relationship also imposed constraints. For example, care has continually been taken to preserve the wholesome, law abiding image. In the
fund -raising area , Weaver explains: " . . . We have to be very careful in
gifts to us . We can't let anybody of an underworld nature give to us ... .
We have had to refuse money .. . send some money back. We can'tlet a
known criminal element be seen with one of these [FSYF) bumper stickers on his car."
The greatest source of restriction remained the donor population, how -
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ever. The overall shaping of FSYF's program and style by the preferences of the donor population has already been discussed. More specifically, despite the consolidation of the Youth Fund, donors were able to
designate particular usage for the funds they donate (e.g., building,
scholarships, etc .). This, of course tended to reduce the agency's flexibility in expenditures . But FSYF was extremely creative in recognizing, indeed appealing to, the tendency of donors to try to earmark how their dollars are spent. The theme which FSYF adopted-"Something for
Everyone" - meant just that. The organization developed elaborate lists
of items .and programmatic needs that donors could "buy" for the agency,
as well as a variety of general purpose memorial and other funds to which
they would contribute.
Still the donor influence at FSYF has been profound . For example,
FSYF became a fairly expansive agency in terms of multiple campuses
and intake services, and ranged far and wide for donors, around the state;
but it was restricted to Florida . Weaver says, "There's too much to do
here ... . I think [expanding outside Florida is) going too far ... . The
needs are just so great ... in the state.' Why do that? . . . There's no reason . . .. "
This seems a curiously modest position for an enterprising, risk-taker
of Weaver's caliber. But the reasons may have something to do with the
donor base . Going interstate would involve overview, perhaps interference by governments in other states, or perhaps even by the federal government under the guise of interstate commerce . FSYF would also risk
losing the "take care of one's own" community flavor of its operation,
and its special association with the image of the local sheriffs. Such a situation would be anathema to the conservative element that built FSYF.
OUTCOMES

To the outside observer, FSYF is a hugely successful physical and fi nancial operation. Under Weaver's direction, the agency moved from a
$114,000 operating budget in 1960 to a $2.3 million budget in fiscal year
1979- all of it from private sources. Just as impressive, the agency generated a substantial surplus of revenue over current expenditures (e .g. ,
$836,000 in fiscal 1977), permitting it to amass a net worth of more
than $12 million in assets. These assets include substantial holdings of
real estate and marketable securities, as well as commercially viable
timber and livestock operations . The intent was to build a self-sustaining
endowment .
Managerially, FSYF is a highly professional business operation . It utilizes modern techniques of data processing, and is meticulous in its accounting and management control, ambitious in its investment program,
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and streamlined and constantly self-evaluating in its internal organization . Its fund-raising operations were most innovative, meticulous, and
diversified. FSYF was highly sophisticated in its approach to estate planning, personalized solicitation of large numbers of small donors, appeal
to large donors, and utilization of non-cash contributions .
Based on its affiliation with the sheriffs, and its careful study of the
psychology of giving and special attention to its own image, FSYF
emerged as a public relations masterpiece . In Florida, the Boys Ranch became practically a household word-representing a good, wholesome,
popular, charitable cause. Strategic, professional use of the media-television, films, literature-broadcast this word in an eminently successful
way .
The reality of FSYF's child care program was somewhat less clear. No
doubt, it had a wholesome program, with marvelous physical facilities
and a well-paid staff. But the notion that it was making a serious impact
on preventing delinquency is unproven. Although one may argue that prevention requires taking in a youngster before he becomes seriously involved with law-breaking, FSYF's intake policy seemed particularly
timid. The emphasis was on the deserving child of unfortunate circumstances, rather than any demonstrated risk of delinquency.
Furthermore, considering the scope of FSYF's financial success, the
agency did not extend itself very far in terms of the number of children
served. While there was expansion to additional campuses and a conscious widening of orientation from local (Boys Ranch) to statewide. the
total population served less then doubled in the 1970s while the operating
budget (not counting accumulated surpluses) increased fivefold. Rather
the emphasis was on establishing a firm financial base for the future of
the agency by building up assets .
ANALYSIS

The chemistry which resulted in the spectacular development of the
Florida Sheriffs Youth Fund appears to have had three essential elements:
the entrepreneurial talent of Harry Weaver, the special imagery of the
sheriffs, and the fertile environment of conservative and elderly donors .
Clearly Weaver was a driving force . Before his tenure the Boys Ranch
was headed for failure . Weaver was the master builder and salesman who
turned the operation around . He seemed to be motivated largely by the
satisfaction of experiencing the fruits of his building efforts, seeing what
he could do in constructing, physically and organizittionally, a viable enterprise almost from scratch .
But Weaver is not simply a builder by instinct and motivation; he is
also a social worker. Possibly as a result of his upbringing, he needed to
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feel that he was "helping people ." Perhaps that is why he was such an effective salesman. When the organization required that he become a fundraiser rather than be directly involved with the children, he transformed
this role into one of counselor for the elderly. He convinced himself that
he was performing a service for his donors, and exuded the sincerity that
came with this resolution. Thus he could not be easily dismissed by potential donors who may have suspected that it was simply their money he
and the Youth Fund were after.
The imagery of the sheriffs played a very special role in the evolution
of FSYF. The sheriffs "law and order, helping" image certainly assisted
the agency to develop the required philanthropic base of support and
make the ranch a public relations man's dream.
The social environment of a conservative, elderly population of potential contributors in Florida was the third element of FSYF's success.
Surely, the Florida of the 1960s and 1970s was one of the more fertile
fields in which to solicit such a group. But this is probably more a matter
of degree than kind. Other states have similar populations, perhaps in
smaller numbers. Essentially, it was the genius of Weaver and his staff,
in organizational design and public relations, that enabled the tapping of
this resource in such a spectacular way .
Given the essential chemistry, the "flashpoint" was the decision in the
early 1960s to put financial development as the agency's first priority.
This decision influenced not only the corporate, financial success but profoundly shaped the style and program of the agency itself. The donor
reigned supreme at FSYF, his influence seen and felt in the physical facilities, administrative operations, staffing, programming, and intake policies. Weaver claims that by giving primacy to the agency's sources of
support, FSYF put the horse before the cart-establishing a firm organizational base to facilitate carrying out the agency's mission . The reverse
may also be argued. Over time, the approach may become more bal anced. According to Weaver. " . .. I believe that we have a good program .... Of course, it is not what we want it to be one day, but we each
day work towards excellence in these areas .
"I like to think that we put equal emphasis on our children's programs
and our public relations and fund-raising. I am convinced that we cannot
survive without placing equal emphasis in these areas."

Outpatient Clinic
(Sagamore Children's Center)
PRECIS
Sagamore Children's Center is one of five psychiatric children's hospitals operated by the New York State Department of Mental Hygiene . In
1974, under the leadership of its director, Dr. Mary Hagamen, Sagamore
received a three year hospital improvement grant from U.S . H .E .W . to
establish an outpatient program. Over the period of the grant, a comprehensive program of outpatient and parent-training services was developed, moving the emphasis of Sagamore's overall program from inpatient
to outpatient care. Following expiration of the grant and the departure of
Dr. Hagamen, this emphasis was largely dissipated, although some of the
new services have been continued.

THE ENTREPRENEUR
Establishing Sagamore's outpatient department involved the efforts of
a number of key people . Staff of the central office of the New York State
Department of Mental Hygiene originally alerted Dr. Hagamen to the opportunity and assisted the negotiations with personnel at U.S. H.E.W.
Staff of the Suffolk County Department of Health, including Dr. Lewis
Kurke and Oliver Shepers, collaborated on development of the plans and
proposal. Aileen Townsend, a social worker picked by Dr. Hagamen as
director of the new department, was largely responsible with others like
Jeff Hammerman for putting the plans into practice, while Ken Kaufman,
a staff psychologist at Sagamore, deserves primary credit for developing
the parent-training components of the program.
The central character, however, was Dr. Mary B. Hagamen, the director of the Sagamore Children's Center. Dr. Hagamen, who generated the
idea, took major responsibility for writing the proposal and hiring and
overseeing the staff that would implement the venture. As Dr. Hagamen
deprecatingly saw her role: " . .. [the] guy from Albany said ... 'You
want to write a letter to Santa Claus?' and I said 'yes' and I wrote it."
Nonetheless, while the grant opportunity may have been fortuitous, and
probably crucial in permitting the development of the outpatient department, it represented a logical extension of Dr. Hagamen's own profes253
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sional thinking and development of programs already underway under her
leadership at Sagamore (see "Organization" below).

THE ORGANIZATION
Sagamore Children' s Center was the first of five state psychiatric hospitals for children in New York State to open in the early 1970s. The hospitals culminated a movement begun in the 1930s to separate child from
adult institutional programs in mental health. In the 1930s, Rockland
State Hospital was built as a special hospital for children, under WPA . In
the 1940s, Rockland became overcrowded with children having emotional problems . In the early 1950s, a state-sponsored committee with
prominent clinicians such as Lauretta Bender developed a plan for children's psychiatric facilities . Twelve new units were envisioned . In the interim, however, temporary facilities for children were opened at King's
Park and Central Islip hospitals on Long Island . In the 1960s, Governor
Rockefeller became interested in the plans, expressing his own predilection for interesting architecture. Ultimately, five new hospitals, each of
approximately 200 bed capacity and 300 to 400 staff, were authorized
and built. Sagamore's mandate was to serve the Long Island region
- Nassau and Suffolk counties.
As Dr. Hagamen explains, the initial conditions and environment under which each of the hospitals opened influenced the nature and flexibility of their operation . The children 's hospital in the Bronx, for example,
opened empty, and was able to give more emphasis to outpatient services
from the start. Sagamore, on the other hand, inherited the child patient
load from King's Park and Central Islip and opened with a nearly full inpatient registration. Still, the children's hospitals were all basically designed as inpatient facilities . As Dr. Hagamen notes: " ... I would say
that the goals of all these places were pretty much the same- to provide
the best possible psychiatric service, with a priority for inpatient service .
In other words, nobody else did the inpatient service to the degree that the
state facilities did . And, therefore, you had to take care of all the inpatients before you could do anything else."
In most respects , Sagamore is a prototypicaa state operation . Expenditure and policy decisions have to be cleared through the central office in
Albany . Employees are civil servants, with appointments drawn from
lists determined by performance on civil service tests .
During Dr. Hagamen 's tenure as director at Sagamore there were some
anomalies in her accountability structure, leaving her a considerable degree of autonomy . Dr. Hagamen recalls: " . . . The director historically
had total accountability to the commissioner (of mental hygiene] . Then
Albany began to interject a series of associate commissioners . Where
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there had been six associate commissioners . ... in 1960, there were over
50 in 1975 .... We started out reporting to the Deputy Commissioner for
Mental Health . Then . .. about 1971, we were changed over . .. to the
Deputy Commissioner for Mental Retardation . . . . Around 1976 . . .
they created an office for children, and .. . we were supposed to report to
[the director of that] but he didn't have any authority over us because he
was a staff ... person . . .. Then they made these :regional offices, where
they put a whole new group of people ... hoping to decentralize . . . .
They did that to a degree, but they didn't take out many of the people in
the central office. So then you had two systems·. And you know, when
you have that, nobody has a line on you . . . ."
The speed with which the proposal for the outpatient department was
approved (see "Chronology"), including its clear intent to shift state supported staff from inpatient to outpatient coverage, attests to Dr. Hagamen's relatively free hand at the time .
ln addition to the formal bureaucratic hierarchy within the Department
of Mental Hygiene, the Director of Sagamore also reports to a Board of
Visitors. This is a group of gubernatorially appointed citizens that serves
essentially as a sounding board for the director, al.though it is required to
make periodic investigations of conditions, and file a report with the governor. Dr. Hagamen found her board helpful and supportive: "Our Board
of Visitors was a watch-dog board, an advisory board, a sounding board
for the director . . . . l think any director likes to have someone to tell
what he is doing . . . to talk . . . to bounce off ideas . . . . We had a
magnificent Board of Visitors . . . . "
"It is a thankless job to be on the Board of Visitors. You have to go to
meetings every month. You have to do investigations .
" . . . Four of the seven people were parents [of current or former patients] . And the ones that were not were very good people . .. [including]
.. . the wife of one of the state representatives .. . (and) a man who was
active in one of the . .. church establishments . .. .
"I'll tell you, l thought that they were behind me 100 percent. And you
know, there was considerable hardship for themselves, too .. .. They
spent hours and hours . . . . They were by far, in my estimation, the best
informed and the most active Board of Visitors in the state. And they
were called all sorts of names by people who were jealous of their position . . . . "
Internally to Sagamore, Dr. Hagamen says that authority was delegated to deputies, under her watchful eye and within established regulations: " . . . Most authority was delegated to division heads but l knew
most everything that was going on , and I didn't like it if I didn't. . . . I
didn't !restrict] what people did, but l had to know it ... and in a .. .
facility where you are dealing with a lot of people that work over a
24-hour period with the same clients, you have to have dependence on
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rules of procedure. Otherwise, it would be chaos .... You have to have
some guidelines. You can't be loose and informal. ... You must draw up
things so people know what to expect. . . ."
Given her accountability structure, service mandates, and available resources, Dr. Hagamen made the most of the discretion at her disposal to
deemphasize institutional (inpatient) care in favor of preventative and
commuity-based alternatives, well before the opportunity of the grant
from U.S. H.E.W. In a paper published in the Journal ofChild Psychiatry, Dr. Hagamen explains the situation faced by Sagamore, early in her
tenure as director: In 1971 we were concerned when it was realized that
although the Center had been conceived and designed as a facility for
children of average intelligence, our energies and resources were being
increasingly utilized by the autistic mentally retarded. It was obvious that
unless ways could be found to decrease the need for 24-hour care ... it
was only a matter of time until the very retarded youngsters would be
utilizing all of our resources to the exclusion of the brighter children .
Thus we looked to means of secondary prevention and alternatives to long
term hospitalization.
" .. . Gradually, over a period of five years, a variety of programs was
developed that focused on the management and treatment of the child in
the context of family at home . . . . The family support services that
evolved . . . can be divided into two major groups-home support systems and parent training programs. " 1
Thus thinking about outpatient-related services and some program developments were already underway at Sagamore by 1974 when the
H. E. W . grant opportunity arose. It was a direction in which Dr. Hagamen 's professional thinking had already been engaged.
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
January, 1970-Sagamore Children's Center is opened. Dr. Mary
Hagamen is appointed as its first director.
1970-1974-Sagamore evolves a series of "home support" programs
to reduce dependence on institutional care of low-functioning (retarded
and autistic) youngsters.
Early 1974-Dr. Hagamen becomes aware, through an office of the
New York State Department of Mental Hygiene, of the possibility of applying for a Hospital Improvement Grant from U.S. H.E.W.
March I, 1974-Sagamore submits the grant application for an outpatient program.
July I, 1974- U.S. H.E.W. approves the three-year grant.
Hagamen, M. (1977). Family support systems. Journal of Child Psychiatry, 53-66.
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September l, 1974- Expenditures on the grant officially begin . Ailene Townsend is appointed as Director of Outpatient Services (a new
department) .
October I, 1974- The Sagamore Outpatient Clinic is opened. Development of an array of outpatient and parent training services is begun .
1976- AIIegations of abuse and neglect in Sagamore 's inpatient program appear in the press. Ultimately, Sagamore is engulfed in controversy and involved in official child abuse proceedings.
May, 1977-Dr. Ken Kaufman is appointed as Director of Outpatient
Services, replacing Ailene Townsend who leaves Sagamore for another
job.
June, 1977 - Dr. Mary Hagamen leaves Sagamore to become Director
of Child Psychiatry Clinic of Nassau County Medical Center. Robert
Evans is appointed as the new director.
August 31, 1977-The Hospital Improvement Grant officially terminates.
January, 1978- The Sagamore outpatient unit is eliminated as a distinct organizational unit. Dr. Kaufman is made Director of Treatment
Services, which encompasses both in and out patient care . Some outpatient services continue . Some are spun-off to external agencies .

CONTEXT
The fact that the Sagamore Outpatient Department was funded by the
last grant under H .E .W.'s Hospital Improvement Program was symbolic
of the juncture in social programming generally evident in the country
and in New York State in the early 1970s. As Dr. Hagamen observes:
"This was the last hospital improvement grant. ... Hospital improvement
plans were very big items in the ' 60s and this was the absolute bottom of
the barrel. We drained the pot. ... The '60s ... were a splurging time
for social and economic programs .. ; [a] release of energies into the War
on Poverty . . . that carried with it programs of building hospitals like
Sagamore Children's Center (and] ... Head start, Title I Education (etc . ].
. . . All kinds of social and economic programs focused on kids and particularly underprivileged kids . [Then came] the first [New York State]
budget crises of 1972 . . . . So in 1974 we were beginning to feel
poor . . . . "
In certain ways, the Sagamore outpatient project represented the thinking of the 1960s. For example, the clinic idea was consistent with the objective of expanding government services to fill existing lacuna. As Dr.
Hagamen notes: "[It was] the first psychiatric clinic for children in Suffolk County . ... It seemed most important to have some kind of an outpatient unit because children would come to us and maybe not need inpa-
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tient care, yet that was the only thing we had to offer . .. . In Suffolk
County in 1974 .. . there were no specific units for children. There were
units for the developmentally disabled run by pediatricians at Suffolk
State School. There were adult psychiatric county services, but there was
no specific link with specialists trained in child psychiatry, geared to
serving children exclusively . . . ."
There was even an anti-poverty flavor to the clinic idea. As Dr. Hagamen explains: "[Just as] education had its problems with segregated
schools, health services had problems in that rich people went to private
outpatient care and poor people went to inpatient care . And inpatient
[care] was always kind of the end of the road . .. . So when you were designated as an inpatient facility, you just caught what was thrown to you .
. . . We were conceived of as kind of the last place, and when I went to
Sagamore it was my goal to make hospitalization treatment of choice
rather than last resort . . . . "
The outpatient project was also consistent with emerging trends of the
1970s. New York State as well as other jurisdictions in. the country had
already begun to embark on "deinstitutionalization" of mental hospitals in
favor of community-based care, and while there was no specific intent to
apply this policy to the recently opened children's hospitals, the outpatient program was certainly consistent with that general policy.
Furthermore , professional thinking about autism and retardation was
progressing to the point where institutional programs were being severely
questioned. The Willowbrook state institution for the retarded in New
York City was soon to come under heavy fire and forced to reduce its
population in favor of community-based care. And as Dr. Hagamen explains , autism was beginning to be understood: " . .. [There was] a lot of
pressure . . . put on us to take all kinds of youngsters . . . particularly
those very low-functioning youngsters whose families did not want to put
them into the facilities for the retarded. . . . [You see] in the 1960s there
was a great confusion that gradually resulted [over] the difference between an autistic youngster and a retarded youngster. At that time, particularly the people in retardation were saying that autism is a psychiatric
disorder and therefore ... if you just do the right psychiatric treatment ,
up would pop a normal child . Well , that was a lot of magic thinking . . . .
Gradually [we found] that 75 percent of autist;c children are retarded and
. . . were appropriately placed with other children with developmental
disabilities and ones who need life long care. But [still] there was great
argument as to where they belonged . Many of the other children's hospitals declined to admit them, but it seemed to me that there was a need for
this service. We were there and if they were going to come in, the only
thing for us to do was to develop services for them. Not to say 'we don 't
have a program .'"
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CHOICES
Development of the Sagamore outpatient program exhibited a combination of fortuitous, evolutionary, and purposeful modes of decision
making . The grant opportunity itself, rather than being deliberately
sought out, was a bolt from the blue . A concerted effort to develop and
fund a coherent outpatient program might never have emerged without
this unexpected opportunity .
Yet in a real sense, Dr. Hagamen and her staff were "ready" for this
choice . There was not much debate over what kind of proposal to prepare. The notion of an outpatient service was a logical extension to the
home-support programs already developed at Sagamore for low-functioning children , and a reasonable response to local service demands . As Dr.
Hagamen explains: "If you saw Sagamore as a bright and shiny
.. . new place with lots of dedication, lots of young staff, you would get
very excited ... if you ... had a [low-functioning] youngster and were
having troubles with him . . . . It would be much easier to apply for a
place here than it would be to apply to a place like Central Islip where
[special children] had been . So , we rapidly became a place with these
low-functioning youngsters . .. (who) are poorly understood and . . . are
excluded from many services . Gradually . .. we ... developed ... programs that began to ... work with these youngsters long before the family became burned out. ... We could (then] make sure that they got into
appropriate day programs . ... [Sometimes] we felt it was better for the
child and better for the family if we only took the child for the weekend ,
rather than have them living in an institution full-time, or at home full time and exhausting their family [or] distorting their family interaction .
So . . . we developed a variety of ways to help families . .. [i .e. ,] familysupport services .... And a natural extension of that ... [because] we
came to look at all children earlier, was to do outpatient work .. . . And
we found that many of the things that we developed for our lowfunctioning youngsters, were also helpful to parents who had hyperactive
kids .... "
As envisioned in the proposal, the outpatient department would provide a potpourri of services , roughly divisible into three categories of psychological and psychiatric treatment and evaluation; behavior management and social casework including family therapy and parent training;
and physical treatment and evaluation including pediatric and neurological diagnosis, and speech and learning therapy . To a large extent the proposed array of services represented special interests of core Sagamore
staff. For example, parent training for the care of handicapped children
was a particular specialty of Dr. Ken Kaufman, while the concept of
diagnostic and evaluation services was modeled somewhat on Columbia
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Presbyterian where Dr. Hagamen had been a resident. Nonetheless, the
services of the outpatient department were not rigidly defined at the outset; rather they were adapted to operational needs as the clinic began to
function . Dr. Hagamen describes some of the evolution (and broadening
of function) that took place: ". . . We began to develop classes for all
kinds of parents. Having started out working with the parents of the retarded, we then began to work with the parents of the hyperactive youngster . . .. The parents began to come to us to understand their children better and to know .. . how to raise kids . . . . So we had some very
wonderful people with some very normal, healthy children come to us
like they might go to adult education. And we felt that that would be a
very good thing ... (because] it was ... helpful to people who had disturbed children to see parents of healthy children there .... I have always
felt that as far as 'mainstreaming' is concerned it is just as important to
bring normal kids and normal people into the activities of the more disturbed [as] it is to get the more disturbed into (normal settings] . . . . "
A similar evolution took place in the diagnostic component of the outpatient program. Dr. Hagamen continues:" ... There are many twists of
the rope that you don't foresee .... (For example] we found that it took
more time to do evaluations. . . . Initially we planned to be able to do
treatment without doing evaluations and we found very quickly that we
could not do treatment on other people's assessments .... We had to do
our own assessments . ... Putting people into treatment using outside referral information . . . we found was .. . not a good idea because we had
such a great demand for treatment from the people that we had already diagnosed .... So ... our treatment programs were largely done with the
people that we diagnosed ourselves .... For instance, (if] a school program worked up a kid and said 'go there for treatment,' we still had to do
an evaluation and assessment."
As befit the concept of the clinic, admission policy gradually broadened not only to include a wide variety of mental disabilities, but also to
permit earlier intervention in children's and families ' problems rather
than have Sagamore serve solely as a last resort. In contrast, however, the
geographic catchment area for the clinic was to be substantially narrower
than that of Sagamore as a whole. Still a gradual broadening was anticipated here too. As Dr. Hagamen explains: "It was a new activity for us,
so it seemed to me that we needed to develop expertise .... It was easier
to start with a tiny core and then work with that, and develop our expertise as we went along .... Hopefully we would be able to transfer it out
of the catchment area . . . once . . . we understood what needed to be
done and how to do it .... We focused on a particular area surrounding
the Sagamore Children's Center .. . in Babylon Township . . . . It
seemed appropriate that we should be focusing on that as our target popu-
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lation but that we would not exclude anyone that came from another
area .. .. "
If program and client policy decisions were developed gradually and
adaptively over the period of the grant, certain strategic organizational
decisions were clearly specified at the outset. A twin rationale underlied
these organizational decisions: (I) Dr. Hagamen 's desire to maximize the
mileage she could get out of whatever (limited) grant funds were available from H.E.W . , and (2) her intention to turn Sagamore "inside out,"
i.e., to shift its emphasis from inpatient to outpatient service.
A key decision was to staff the clinic largely with "per diem" people
rather than full-time career employees. This would minimize fringe benefit costs associated with permanent employees and it would avoid long
term commitments to people before their performance in the program
could be properly assessed. Dr. Hagamen elaborates: "It was a very small
grant-a hundred thousand dollars a year for three years ... . What I did
was to take the basic Sagamore staff and use them as senior people . . .
but I hired per diem psychiatrists, per diem psychologists [etc.] ... . The
idea was to use the core personnel from the Center, and then let them pick
whom they [wishedj .. .. The people would come in from the outside . . .
an afternoon a week and work in the outpatient clinic . And that meant
that I really didn't have to pay that 331/3% fringe . ... [Another] reason
for hiring people on a per diem basis .. . was . . . that we could decide
whether we ever wanted them in a civil service position . .. . You really
can't tell from a curriculum vitae or an interview what a person is going to
be like . . . . Even with extensive recommendations you need to know
how that person fits into your system, and this was an ideal way to find
out whether anyone fit into our system."
As Dr. Hagamen observed, $100,000 a year wasn't very much money,
but what she managed to do was to leverage this money with state funds,
at an increasing rate over time so that more and more resources were devoted to the clinic operation. It was all part of her "inside-out" strategy to
deemphasize inpatient care: " ... This is another reason that it might have
been attractive to H. E. W . ... [In the j first year I put in l 00 thousand dollars of state funds with a 100 thousand dollars offederal funds. The [second] year, I added enough staff from the State, so it was $200,000 of state
funds and $100,000 of federal funds . . . . The next year we made it
$300,000 of state funds .. .. You see, so as you close down the hospital
[inpatient wards ... you build up the clinic] .. . . I thought it was a very
neat thing ."
All this was consistent, of course, with Dr. Hagamen's general ideas
on how to improve patient care: "We wanted ... not .. . just to ...
lower inpatient care . . . we wanted to provide the services needed . . .
and we felt that we could do that by offering alternatives to inpatient care
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. . . with a better assessment of the youngsters who would be referred to
us, particularly from Suffolk County [where outpatient services for children were meager] . . . ."
Over the period of Dr. Hagamen 's tenure, the inpatient census of Sagamore was reduced from approximately 190 to 70, while the number of
outpatients rose from approximately 50 in 1971 to 250 in 1977. The bulk
of these changes were effected during the 1974-1977 grant period. One
aspect of the "inside-out" decision was that Sagamore became bifurcated
into two separate departments, a shrinking inpatient department and a
growing outpatient department, with staff assigned to one or the other,
and with the momentum of excitement (and possibly morale) favoring the
latter. It was a situation that seems to have had serious long term implications . (see "Risks and Constraints" below.)

RISKS AND CONSTRAINTS
Turning a hospital "inside-out" would appear to be a rather radical
venture, entailing concomitant, risks and resistance. But Dr. Hagamen
seems to have had a fairly free hand until late into the grant period, when
some of the risk factors began to materialize .
One of the risks was that Sagamore would be penalized financially by
the State for having reduced its bed capacity, the traditional "hard" indicator of hospital workload . Initially Dr. Hagamen was assured that this
would not be the case, but with the onset of the State's fiscal crisis the assurance became less meaningful. Dr. Hagamen recalls: " . .. There were
problems because we were given cutbacks continuously from Albany because the census was going down and they began to allot staff based on
increase in census, which was just the opposite of what they had told
[us]."
A more serious source of risk was not specifically associated with the
outpatient project so much as with the general tenuousness of the director's position. Running an institution for troubled children provides ample oportunities for incidents to occur that can be exploited by opponents
of the director's policies or by the media, seriously hampering the director's effectiveness. Of more specific relevance to the outpatient venture,
it was possible, although apparently unanticipated at the time, that phasing down the inpatient program would decrease the effectiveness of supervision in that area, hence increasing the chance of an incident. In any
case, such an incident did occur in 1976, causing Dr. Hagamen to renect
on the risks: " .. . We went through some pretty hairy times based on
some distortion of .. . minor incidents that were blown way out of proportion . . . . And because of the rapidity by which our communication
system works now, there is always something on television, or a [news-
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paperj headline going into every home . So the life span of an administrator is cut down enormously compared to years ago . ... You can't tolerate
too many of these [incidents j. . . . "
In terms of actually implementing the outpatient program, Dr. Hagamen faced a number of conventional constraints associated with state
government operations. For example, as noted earlier, funding for the
program would not have been possible without the external grunt: "[If the
grant] hadn't come through . . . I don't think I could have done it. ... I
probably would have fought [for it) ... but I think the time was not right
for me to get any money [from the State]to do anything. It was also likely
that 'bottom line' resistance would develop to a complete phase out of the
inpatient program ."
Dr. Hugamen feels this is endemic to any effort to eliminate a government program: " . .. I'm sure that on the part of some people . .. there
was a worry that as we decreased the inpatient beds that we would be
working ourselves out of existence . . .. And that is kind of hard for people [in) civil service to accept. . .. When the thing worked and we got the
inpatient population . .. down to about 75 . . . people began to think
'Gosh, we need more patients.' . . . It's something to think about. .. . In
the large state governments where in the past 15 years [there] have been a
tremendous number of innovations, what you find is .. . !when] a program . .. comes that replaces [another) . . . nobody will have the guts to
cut [ the latter program] out."
Despite a generally effective, cooperative relationship that Dr. Hagamen enjoyed with officials of the State Department of Mental Hygiene in
developing and processing the grant proposal, she still complained about
the cumbersomeness of working administrative matters through the central office in the state capital. For example, the grant called for a subcontract for computer services: "[One problem was) . . . being able to develop contracts ... . you know as a state agency, having to follow their
contract protocol and getting approvals in Albany. !Things ] would come
through two or three weeks later. . . ."
Of all constraining factors, the civil service appointment system gave
Dr. Hagamen the most grief in implementing the grant, although she got
what she wanted after long hours of interviewing and processing candidates on civil service lists: ". . . You are very hampered in government
operations by having to deal with civil service lists . . . . Some of the
problems [with] civil service . .. were overcome by our stamina and
knowledge .... I think we went down several dozen people on the list to
get [the outpatient director] . . .. Civil service is a cumbersome method of
hiring, and we followed the rules to the nth degree. But it is an exhausting
procedure . Many people on the list have no idea of what the job is about
and are really not interested, but to protect their standing on the list they
respond to the canvass letter. This means hours of interviews .... I had
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interviews on my free days ... ·. I worked on Sunday and ... I had people
come from out of state for 8 o'clock appointments on Sunday morning,
because I had to start early to finish the interviewing .... (This] is why
people dori't do it. It just takes so much out of you ."

OUTCOMES
During the period of the grant (1974) - 1977) Sagamore Children's
Center was rather dramatically turned "inside-out," exhibiting a major reduction of its inpatient beds and a build up to about 250 outpatients and
180 parent-training participants . Yet following 1977 the enterprise began
to unravel. In January of 1978 the outpatient department was eliminated
as a separate organizational unit, by Sagamore's new director, and staff
members were no longer exclusively assigned to outpatient care. By 1979
the outpatient case load had dropped to 140 and the parent training enrollment to about 50. In contrast, the inpatient census rose from about 60
in 1977 to 130 in 1979.
There was also a change in the nature of outpatient care. Rather than
serve children with a broad spectrum and varying levels of disability in a
preventive orientation, Sagamore now confined its outpatient service to
cases which would otherwise require immediate inpatient care. Similarly,
parent training services were tied more closely to the needs of the inpa..
tient population.
To a degree these changes were hedged by the spin-off of services
from the outpatient department to other agencies in Suffolk County. For
example, developmental pediatric services was still funded by Sagamore
but administered by the Psychiatry Department at the State University at
Stony Brook . And training for parents of autistic children was turned over
to the Suffolk Child Development Center, with Sagamore staff (Ken
Kaufman) in consultation .
It is difficult to pinpoint what caused the demise of the Sagamore outpatient program, but two factors are obviously involved---·the departure
of Mary Hagamen from Sagamore, and the expiration of the H.E. W.
grant, both in the summer of 1977.
Although Dr. Hagamen took a relatively back-seat role in actually running the clinic, it was her sponsorship and support that enabled it to grow .
It was "her baby ." Anything that hampered her effectiveness would be
likely to reduce the viability of the embryonic new department . The
events of 1976-allegations of child abuse, child protective hearings,
and adverse media coverage in connection with incidents in Sagamore's
inpatient section- apparently took their toll. Although she rode out the
storm, Dr. Hagamen had lost considerable strength. It became inevitable
that she would leave, and that her pioneering programs would be jeopar-

Outpatient Clinic (Sagamore Children's Center)

265

dized: "It was futile ... to do anything. I waited until the whole thing
was over ... but I didn't want to [leave] ... in the middle of that mishmash .... "
"[In any case] I had to finish the job I started . I did everything that I
felt I could do within the state system .... By the time I had the outpatient department done, by the time I had turned this hospital inside-out, I
had done everything . . . that could be done in a state hospital . . .. I was
ready to go on . . . . "
Even if Dr. Hagamen had not left, or if the adverse publicity had not
marred her tenure, it is very possible that the outpatient program might
have been phased down anyway . Without its external touchstone of support from the expiring grant, a renewed state endorsement and additional
funds for the program would have to be sought. And it was becoming
clear that the times were not right for this. Indeed, as Dr. Hagamen observes, it seemed more logical to disperse Sagamore's outpatient work
throughout the county:" ... We had arrived at the next chapter in the delivery of health services in the Department of Mental Hygiene .... Many
things were changing rapidly .... Funds were changing from the state to
the county [level] . . . . Population was moving eastward [on Long Island], away from the Center . . . . The [State] University [Health Sciences Center at Stony Brook] was beginning to develop. A lot of things
were happening . . . . There was [also] an increased need for inpatient
care for adolescents. Therefore, as the outpatient department evolved, so
did the recognition that here was a building that was empty in terms of
what it was designed for . . . . For Nassau and Suffolk Counties . . .
therefore, would it not be appropriate to put those youngsters in that
empty space that was now occupied by more preventive [services] and
... to have the prevention programs move out to the community?
"[So] ... it depends on where you take your photograph .... [Up to)
1976 there was a very optimistic outlook. Things were moving [toward
outpatient emphasis] . If you take a photograph at the end of 1978, looking at the outpatient department, you see that the regional office had said
'Look, we built this as a hospital. The outpatient department should be in
the community. Therefore, we want you to ... do what needs to be done
first. . . . Do what this hospital was built to do ... "'

ANALYSIS
The Sagamore outpatient program was an opportunistic response to an
RFP (request for proposal) by an energetic, idealist psychiatric professional committed to principles of good clinical practice, and to leadership
in the world of professional ideas.
The venture took place in the public sector simply by circumstance.
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The grant opportunity was noticed by someone in the State Department of
Mental Hygiene and found fertile soil in Dr. Hagamen's administration of
Sagamore . It is perhaps more germane to ask why Dr. Hagamen became a
public sector administrator to begin with. Certainly she chafed constantly
against the bureaucratic environment of the state system . But it was basically a physician's career ladder- specifically that ·of a child psychiatric
professional-that Dr. Hagamen had followed. As such she had worked
in both the nonprofit and public sectors. But it was the State, in recognition of her service as supervising psychiatrist at Central Islip State Hospital, that gave Dr. Hagamen the first major opportunity to shape her own
program, as director of a new children's hospital. It was in this context
that the outpatient program took root .
The clinic represented a natural extension of Dr. Hagamen's beliefs in
early intervention and prevention-focused care , and parent-oriented training and support systems. It also provided a context for her involvement at
the crossroads of psychiatric, pediatric, and obstetric disciplines. More
than this, the outpatient department was an experiment-a model of the
"inside-out" concept which Dr. Hagamen sought to demonstrate to her
professional colleagues in other psychiatric hospitals.
The Sagamore outpatient program demonstrated both the skills and
limits of Dr. Hagamen as a manager and administrator. Primarily a physician, and unused to the grantsmanship· game or other aspects of entrepreneurship, she might never have organized such a project if others had not
made her aware of the opportunity. As an idealist, she is impatient with
the administrative mentality, viewing bureaucracy as an obstacle to be
overcome rather than to be indulged. Nonetheless, as an energetic, tenacious, competitive, and achievement-oriented person, she acquired considerable strategic skill in overcoming civil service constraints to staff the
clinic by her own standards. And as a respected physician with adequate
support at the top, and good standing among professional colleagues, she
was able to indulge a relatively free hand to reorganize Sagamore Chil··
dren's Center as she wished .
In 1974- 1975, Dr. Hagamen was riding high. Hard work and good
fortune had produced federal money to organize a pet .prograrn . She enjoyed not only a good personal reputation, but savored the image of Sagamore as a bright new children's psychiatric facility, with enthusiastic
young staff. And her outpatient program, whi e somewhat inconsistent
with Sagamore's original design parameters, was consistent with the
State's new emphasis on deinstitutionalization of mental health. She succeeded in turning Sagamore inside-out although she may have erred strategically in departmentalizing inpatient and outpatient programs in a
manner that might have demoralized the former .
In 1976 things began to change. Dad publicity emanating from incidents in the inpatient department undercut Dr. Hagamen 's base of sup-
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port. In 1977 the H.E.W. grant ran out, removing a strong reason for continued state commitment to the outpatient program. More conventional
bureaucratic and political forces began to reclaim lost ground. Sagamore
workload and budgeting requirements were still seen from above in terms
of inpatient beds and Sagamore's institutional space began to be coveted
to satisfy new demands for adolescent inpatient care. State budget crises
reinforced these pressures to consolidate around old lines of defense and
to allow local communities to pick up outpatient programs. Dr. Hagamen
was no longer in the driver's seat. In better times , she might not only
have completed the "inside-out" strategy, but found a way to maintain it
on a more permanent basis .

